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CHAPTER

1

BACKGROUND TO REFORM

The purpose of this paper is to examine the official and

popular reactions in Czechoslovakia to the Soviet policies of

perestroika

and glasnost

from Gorbachev's attaining the

post of General Secretary in March of 1985 to the Czech and

Slovak elections in June of 1990.

The central argument of

this thesis is that Mikhail Gorbachev, while attempting to

restructure his system, orchestrated the transformation of

Czechoslovakia as well as the other countries of East-Central
While the paper provides background to the general

Europe.

socio-political situation in Czechoslovakia before

Gorbachev's "new thinking," emphasis is placed on social,
economic, and political

Czechoslovakia over

a

changes that have developed in

period of five years.

The period for

this thesis begins with Gorbachev's attaining power in March
1985 and ends with the June 1990 elections.

Attention is also focused upon
in November and December of 1989,

the "Velvet Revolution"

and what its impact means

for the future of Czechoslovakia and the country's

relationship with the rest of Europe.

merely

a

This thesis is not

history of events, but rather a history of one man's

1

impact on Czechoslovakia.

This thesis examines the many

factors involved not only with the "Velvet Revolution" and

with the shaping of Czechoslovakia's "new course."

Mikhail

Sergeyevich Gorbachev set these in motion.
In March 1985,

Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev succeeded

Constantin Chernenko as the General Secretary of the Soviet
Union.

Since then, the remarkable social, political, and

economic changes occurring within Soviet borders has had

a

dramatic impact upon the rest of the globe. The relationship

between the Soviet Union and the United States has improved
substantially, and the degree of cooperation between the two

superpowers has never been greater in the postwar period.
There have been momentous events of lasting historic

significance between the United States and the Soviet Union,
such as the ratifying of the INF Treaty (1987)

.

Indeed,

East-

West relations have entered a new phase of development, the
future of which, will depend in large part on the volatile

political environment in the Soviet Union. At least for now,
some longstanding problems such as arms control and human

rights are being addressed, but nowhere in the world has the

change in Soviet leadership had a greater impact than in

East-Central Europe.
The leadership of Mikhail Gorbachev has certainly paved

the way for sweeping change in East-Central Europe but it has

also caused the revival of some traditional ethnic conflicts
that had been suppressed for forty years due to Soviet

2

domination" of the area.

In Czechoslovakia,

the Slovaks are

again protesting discrimination from the Czech majority.

Ethnic tension in varying degrees is manifesting itself in
each East-Central European country and is probably most acute
in the Soviet Union.

Although Gorbachev's policies have

created the opportunity for reform, they are also responsible
for the surfacing of these ethnic tensions

surface.]

[to come to the

Outside of dismantling the "nomenklatura" system,

the ethnic/nationalism problems are probably the most serious

obstacles to successful reform in East-Central Europe.

If

the new post-communist governments can successfully deal with

the ethnic problems, then the probability of systemic reform

will increase dramatically.
The dual policies of perestroika

glasnost

(openness)

,

(restructuring)

,

and

initiated by Gorbachev with the goal of

revitalizing the Soviet economic sector have overlapped and

directly influenced the political landscape in East-Central
Europe

.

Without Gorbachev, or someone very

similar in political outlook, the political changes in East-

Central Europe would not have taken place as rapidly as they
did.

William H. Luers,

a former

ambassador to Czechoslovakia

wrote that

"Gorbachev's revolution is clearly the starting point.
Without the Soviet leader's "new thinking," perestroika
and glasnost, the fundaments of Soviet relations with
It was
Eastern Europe could not have changed so rapidly.
Gorbachev
'
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changing vision of Soviet national security and national
interests that created the conditions for the revolutions
of Eastern Europe." 1
It

is quite clear,

however, that the Soviet reforms were

viewed with skepticism and ambivalence from most of the
communist leadership in "bloc" countries.

In Romania,

Nicolae Ceaucescu flatly denied that any such reforms would
ever take place, while in East Germany, Erich Honecker said
that such reforms were not needed in his country.

Gustav

Husak lauded Gorbachev's proposals publicly but was unwilling
to follow the Soviet move toward economic decentralization

and criticism of past "mistakes" made by communist forebears.
This is because Czechoslovakia continued to feel the impact
of the "normalization policies" carried out after the "Prague

Spring" in 1968.

Husak adopted

a Fabian,

or delaying policy

toward the implementation of plans similar to those of the
new Soviet leader. The conservative faction in the

Czechoslovak leadership initially thought that Gorbachev
would lose power in the Soviet Union.

In this instance the

Czechoslovak government would be free to continue with the
policy of normalization indefinitely. Gorbachev posed

a

dilemma for the Czech leadership because he reversed the
Soviet political and ideological outlook.

Where Brezhnevism

had been characterized by conservativeness and later
immobilism, Gorbachev advocated radical, dynamic solutions to
the problems plaguing the Soviet system.

4

As partial

justification for his policies, Gorbachev criticized
"mistakes" that had occurred under former Soviet leaders.
Increasingly, both Stalin and Brezhnev became subjects of

criticism in the Soviet press and in Gorbachev's speeches.
Since the Czechoslovak leadership owed their positions to
Brezhnev,

Gorbachev's criticism became an embarrassment to

them. The justification of Czechoslovak normalization was

jeopardized by Gorbachev's radical departure from Soviet
foreign policy norms.

Whether he knew it or not, he

destabilized the Czechoslovak government, and was ultimately
responsible for its eventual downfall in 1989.

He made it

impossible for the communist government installed after the

Prague Spring to react and adapt to changes inside the Soviet
Union.

Karen Dawisha states that during Gorbachev's first

two years in power the official Czechoslovak reaction was

more openly hostile than expressed elsewhere.
"The same stilted phrases were used to heap empty praise
on the Soviets, and the same ritualistic formulae filled
the columns of the Czechoslovak Party newspaper, Rude
Pravo, allowing the concealment of the substance of
'

.the leading
reforms being introduced in Moscow
figures in Prague openly expressed their concern about
the impact of Soviet reformism on Czechoslovakia "2
.

.

.

A key point to remember when considering the failure of
is that even into the late

communism in Czechoslovakia
1980s,

the leadership continued to follow the political and

economic policy of "normalization" that began after the
Prague Spring to eliminate the reformist elements in society.

5

The spectre of 1968 lingered in the minds of the

Czechoslovak leadership until eventually it overcame them.
Vasil Bilak, the former Secretary of the Czech Central

Committee

published an article in the Soviet Party journal,

,

Kommunist, attacking efforts to introduce market mechanisms
into socialist economics as
stick of dynamite set under the foundations of the
system of political power of the working people
.the
correct way lies in precisely the opposite direction:
Making better use of the advantages offered by a
socialist economy
.improving planned development
.strict and comprehensively substantiated criteria
for each enterprise "3
.a

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

Bilak openly praised Soviet intervention in 1968. He

typified

the reaction of the Czechoslovak hard liners who

viewed Gorbachev's proposed reforms as both economically
destabilizing, and politically risky.

He warned of

".
.those that wish to misuse against socialism the
general sympathy with which the social changes in the
USSR are regarded
.he cautioned people to reject
unambiguously any and all parallels, programs, and those
measures which had been designed to dismantle socialism
.

.

.

in 1968. "4

By advocating reform Gorbachev placed the Czechoslovak

policy of "normalization" in an extremely precarious position
concerning the legitimacy of the regime.

Judy Batt addressed

this problem of legitimacy, writing that:
"The ideological problem posed by economic reform for
communist one-party states is not that it makes the
Party's position untenable, but that by opening up the
prospect of democracy as an option, it undermines the
logical basis for the Party's absolute claim to the
6

necessity of its "leading role" provided by the
totalitarian concept of the "social interest." For East
European regimes, the necessity of the party's leading
role is revealed as contingent upon particular historical
circumstances that brought the region under Soviet
domination after World War Two. The party thus appears
as merely the instrument of national subordination to a
foreign power. "5

Considering that the Czechoslovak Party elite was
installed after the Prague Spring at the behest of the Soviet
Union, and combined with the fact that Gorbachev still had
not recanted the Soviet intervention,

it is really not

surprising that Husak, Bilak, and other senior Party members
acted with great reserve toward the reformist course

established by Gorbachev.

The desire of the political elite

was to retain rigid control in social, economic, and

political spheres. By advocating

decentralization, openness,

restructuring, and pluralism, Gorbachev indirectly attacked
the "leading role" of the Party argument which had been the

ideological cornerstone of the Czechoslovak government.

The

cement that held this cornerstone in place for so many years
was finally cracked not by the indigenous dissident movement

from below, or from any change in policy from the Czech
leadership, but by the General Secretary of the Soviet Union.
To comprehend the current situation in Czechoslovakia it
is necessary to review the events of 1968 and briefly
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illustrate the aspects of the Czech Action Programme as well
as the major elements of "normalization" which was the

counteraction of the Soviet led Husak regime
The 1966—69 economic reform involved a substitution of

the system of central planning and management by a system of

market socialism.

The basic principles of this reform were

approved by the Presidium of the CCP in September 1964, and
by the Central Committee in January of 1965.

The 13th Party

Congress approved the plan in the summer of 1966.

There are

several main features of the plan, or new economic model,
(NEM)

.

Vladimir Kusin illustrated these as the following:

Combination

Mechanism

of

and

a

Perspective

Autonomous

Controlled

Plan,

Market

Enterprises

In the system of central planning the driving force of

the economy was the planning center.

Individual enterprises

became passive elements which carried out orders of the
center relating to both methods of production and the
They were rewarded

composition and deliveries of output.

according to the degree to which they fulfilled the directive
order of the center and were removed from competitive

pressures and from the necessity of covering their production
costs through the sale of their output

combination of

a

.

The NEM involved a

perspective plan, a controlled market

mechanism and active use of monetary and fiscal policy.

The

rules of the NEM were designed to shift, at least partly, the
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driving power of the economy from the center to individual

enterprises which became free to select their own methods of

production and composition of output.

Individual enterprises

were to become increasingly responsible for covering their
costs, with the overall aim of maximizing "gross income."
In the NEM only a small percentage of all prices were

directly fixed by the government.

Prices of most products

were to be fixed by enterprises under the supervision of the

center and were to equilibrate the market demand and supply.

Decentralization

of

Investment

In the case of decentralization of investment,

with the

exception of strategic investments, which were reserved for
the center, normal investments were to be financed from

retained profits and bank loans.

Uniform

Taxation

of

Enterprises

In the NEM a uniform taxation was introduced which was

based on the "gross income" of enterprises and included

a six

percent capital charge, and eighteen percent gross income
tax,

and a two percent tax from the value of business

inventories
There was also a draft bill prepared in 1968 that called
for three types of enterprises.

these were:

According to Galia Golan,

social, public, and those based on shares.

social enterprise would be an autonomous unit managed

The

by its

own direction, but within the framework of the government's

9

overall economic policy.

It alone was

its business transactions.

responsible for all

The public enterprise was neither

autonomous nor self supporting, belonging directly to the
state.

Such enterprises were limited to certain national

services such as railways, waterworks, and roads, etc.

The

third type of enterprise can be considered private ownership
as small cooperatives in services.

To limit the government's interference in the function
of the market and enterprise autonomy,

there was a

reorganization of the governmental economic organs.

Ministries would be controlled by placing them under
central economic policy board.
was created on April 12,

a

This National Economic Board

1968 as a supraministerial body.

This body would prepare the government's

policies on

national economic questions, while also bearing

responsibility for "macro-aspects" of the economy.

Ota Sik

stated that this measure was designed to prevent

administrative monopolies by the ministries as well as

bureaucratic delays.
reduced and modified.

A number of other state organs were
This included the State Planning

Commission and the Commission for Finances Prices and Wages.
Included also in this wave of reforms was the gradual

elimination of state subsidies.
Galia Golan stated that the general thrust of reforms

during the 1968 period was to strengthen the role of the
market. There were also changes in the foreign trade sector.

Convertibility of currency, the Czech koruna
10

,

was a goal, and

there was an effort to increase Czech linkage with the
world
market.

This effort was not designed to decrease

participation, or withdrawal from CEMA, or even the

achievement of economic independence, but to increase the

efficiency of the total Czechoslovak economic situation.
This became an issue later when Czechoslovakia was accused of

attempting "radical" changes in not only its economy, but
changes that would disrupt the bloc economics as a whole.
The Czech reform movement, however,

sought greater

cooperation between the socialist countries, and not the
reverse
What is ironic about many of the proposed Czech reforms

during this period is their similarity to some of the plans
and policies that Gorbachev has implemented in the Soviet

Union over the last five years.

Certainly the overall goal

of economic efficiency is the same.

Decentralization, worker

self management, and reorganization of at least some major

organs of the state bureaucracy are part of perestroika

they were central elements in the Prague Spring.

,

and

Indeed, the

Prague Spring may have begotten the Moscow Spring.
"Asked at a press conference to explain the main
difference between Gorbachev and Alexander Dubcek,
Gennadi Gerasimov, the spokesman for the Soviet Ministry
of Foreign Affairs, answered, "Nineteen years. "6
One could consider that the political and economic

reforms undertaken by the Dubcek regime were correct but

premature in implementation.
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It was the

political reform

that incurred the intervention in Czechoslovakia by
the

Soviet Union, and other Warsaw Pact troops.

In January 1968

Alexander Dubcek replaced Antonin Novotny as party leader and
the first public declarations were made regarding the

intention to implement reforms.

Novotny had been criticized

by a reform element inside the party as well as liberal

elements from outside.

In February the CPCz Presidium gave

its permission for economic plans that had been adopted in

1965 to proceed, and created a commission that was charged

with the drafting of a new Action Program.

In March

personnel changes at the highest levels signified gathering

momentum for reforms.

Novotny resigned as President and was

replaced by Ludvik Svoboda

Many other officials resigned or

.

were recalled including the Minister of Internal Affairs.

Journalists, students, and writers appealed for an amendment
to the Press Law of 1966 to end censorship.

Public rallies

began in earnest demanding; rehabilitation of victims of
improvement of Church-state relations, and an

Stalinism,

investigation into the death

Minister Jan Masaryk.

in March 1948 of Foreign

There was also an increasing number of

people advocating a federal system for Czechoslovakia.

By

the end of March a CPCz session approved the principles of

Czech-Slovak federalization.

In April more personnel changes

were made in the ministries and other public organizations.

Youth groups and worker's unions arose outside the official

structures

.
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While reform was being implemented in Czechoslovakia,
the Soviet Union began drafting its response to the changes.

Critical comments were made by the Soviet Union regarding

reform at the Warsaw pact summit in March, while in April the
Soviet Union asked Prague to allow Soviet/WTO military

maneuvers on Czechoslovak territory in June.
In May the idea of self-management was added by the

Czechoslovak leadership to the economic reform package.
There was disagreement between Czechoslovak conservatives and
the reform element of the party about the reforms.

The

public, however, overwhelmingly supported the new wave of

reforms

.

Soviet displeasure with the Czechoslovak program

became acute in May.

Soviet generals asserted the USSR's

"readiness" to help "the sound forces of the CPCz" by

military means if asked.

Throughout the month Soviet

officers including Marshal Grechko visited Czechoslovakia in

preparation for Soviet exercises.
In June the party leadership abolished censorship,

advocated

a new

foreign policy,

stressing "friendly" East-

West relations, and began a review of party statutes.

In

June and July the international situation between

Czechoslovakia and the other members of the Warsaw pact,
excluding Romania, worsened.

From July 29 to August

1

negotiations took place between the Presidiums of the CPCz
and the CPSU in the small town of Cierna pri Cope.

Although

the Czech leadership felt that a compromise had been reached,

13

this was not the case.
German, Bulgarian,

and.

The Soviet Union with Polish, East

Hungarian troops invaded

Czechoslovakia on August 20, 1968, and ended the Prague
Spring
The political discourse in 1967—68 Czechoslovakia

revolved mainly around such points as the role of the party,
separation of party and state, the possibility of an
opposition, and the status of Slovakia.

It was the

question

about the role of the party that was the most important

"According to the Action Program, the party would not
command or 'rule over society' nor replace the social
and political institutions, whichrepresented the varied
interests and groups within society
and that the
party should play the role of arbitrator, seeking a
method of satisfying various interests, while not
sacrificing the interest of the whole society. "7
.

.

.

Golan added that;

.in addition

to the party’s programmatic function
'the practical efforts of the people
to ensure the implementation of the party's line
.the difference was the way in which the party was to
carry out this function. As the party was not to command
and was to abandon its monopoly on power, it was to
exercise its authority by way of example and persuasion
without benefit of the cadre system, intimidation, or
".

.

it should coordinate
.

.

coercion

.

8

There were proposals to control the power of the party by

adjusting the idea of democratic centralism to permit innerparty democracy.

Debate and discussion of conflicting views

would be part of the norm, while elections within the party
would have to be democratized via secret ballot.
statutes,
a new

The party

drafted after the Action Program sought to provide

democratic framework for party activities, placing
14

emphasis more on the rights of members and participation than
on duties and discipline.

Guarantees were provided such as:

the right of a member to resign, and to be present at all

proceedings against him, accessibility of information,
limitation of terms of office for elected officials, and
secret ballot

.

Discussion included an argument for a system

of separation of power which would serve as a safeguard

against monopolization of power.
"Dubcek and Smrkovsky recognized that freedom of
expression would not be enough, and that democracy could
be promised only through a functioning system of
effective institutions dividing the executive, judiciary,
and legislature, independent of the party and 'open in
every respect to control and criticism. "9
The liberals urged a return to the rule of law as the

best safeguard against abuse of power.

They demanded the

federalization of political, social, and governmental bodies.
The Federal parliament would consist of a house based on the
one man one vote principle, and a second house composed of

equal representatives of both the Czech lands and Slovakia.

Concerning foreign policy, the Czech regime continually
repeated its commitment to the Warsaw Pact, while also

asserting the need for mutual respect of sovereignty and

equality within the socialist camp to permit each country to
develop socialism according to its specific conditions-separate roads to socialism.

Dubcek also spoke of another

point, which was a "return to Europe" policy.

This meant the

recognition of Czechoslovakia as part of Europe, and the

15

pursuit of normal relations as well as cooperation with the

European states, despite social systems.
The Prague Spring, an experiment in "socialism with a

human face" had three basic aims. These were: political

liberalization of the Stalinist model, economic
liberalization, which would create an atmosphere where the

economy could perform with a greater degree of autonomy and
efficiency, and lastly, the federalization of the national
system, which would grant greater equality to the Slovak

minority.

Volgyes wrote that;

"at the heart of the matter of these reforms lay the goal

of political liberalization "10

Yet,

it was

precisely this,

and the pluralism which began to emerge in Czechoslovakia
that was considered a challenge by the Soviet Union. The

Soviet leadership decided to curtail the Czechoslovak

experiment before it "infected" other members of the WTO.
Consequently, the Soviet Union and other members of the WTO

invaded Czechoslovakia in August 1968, and within two years,
most of the reforms undertaken by the reformist element of
the Czech Communist Party were eliminated.

Slovakia did

achieve greater autonomy under the federal system.

The

Soviet crackdown in 1968 leads to the next chapter of

Czechoslovak history, known as "normalization."

NORMALIZATION

1969-1989:

To the Soviets, the process of normalization meant
"the complete exposure and stamping out of the subversive
activities of the right-wing, anti-socialist forces
16

.and the resolute strengthening of the leading role
of the Communist Party in the activities of the state
agencies, in the ideological and public spheres,
.in
the whole life of the country
.

.

.

By treaty,

.

60,000-70,000 Soviet troops were stationed in

Czechoslovakia, the entire reformist leadership was driven
from office, and the Czechoslovak Communist Party was purged.
This purge effectively stifled any effort at reform by

removing anyone who was thought to have such tendencies from
any office or position where they might communicate their

beliefs, and thereby have an impact upon other members of
society.

Hans Renner reported that for seven months

Screening Commissions interviewed over
members.

1.5

million Party

150,000 communists voluntarily left the CPCz

.

Some

326,000 people were refused new Party cards, and the total
losses to the CPCz was roughly 28 percent of its membership.
The media, which had enjoyed considerable freedom during the

Prague Spring was dealt with severely.
closed, Rude Pravo

Newspapers were

lost 45 of 80 editors, and one out of two

journalists lost their jobs.
"In Czechoslovakia over 900 professors (out of about
3,500) were dismissed, and the Czechoslovak Academy of
Sciences fared no better, losing roughly 1,200 scholars,
.30 percent of the
and closing five departments
full-time officials of the Czechoslovak Revolutionary
Trade Union had to leave, 40 percent of the economic
managers had to step down, as did 30 percent of the
commanding officers in the army and police. Nearly
14,000 Party officials and other paid employees were
dismissed from Party ranks. "12
.

17

.

Between 250,000 and 300,000 people left Czechoslovakia as
direct victims of these purges.

These were professional

people such as doctors, educators, and other professionals.
The resulting consequences, according to Hans Renner were

"quite disastrous."
"The almost complete stagnation and even regression of
social life in the 1970s and early 1980s are
.due to
the purges "13
.

.

.

The enthusiasm and optimism of the Prague Spring gave

way to political apathy and passivity, which was encouraged
by the Husak regime.

Depoliticization was encouraged in two

ways; harsh repression of all opposition through arrests and

trials, and an attempt to increase the standard of living to

thwart possible unrest. Normalization continued well into the
late nineteen eighties, even after the deaths of three

conservative Soviet leaders and the replacement of Gustav
Husak by Milos Jakes in 1987 as Secretary General.
However,

in 1985 Gorbachev became the General Secretary

of the Soviet Union,

and along with his ascent to power began

the dual policies of change: perestroika, and glasnost.
a result,

As

changes in Soviet foreign and domestic policies

have taken place, giving East-Central Europe more flexibility
to implement their domestic policies, and greater latitude in

foreign relations. Gorbachev himself reinforced the idea at
the Strasbourg Speech on July

18

6,

1989.

The speech, addressed

to a parliamentary assembly of the Council of Europe

contained an important message to both "reformers" and public
of East-Central Europe.
"The fact that the states of Europe belong to a different
social system is a reality.
The recognition of this
historical fact and respect for the sovereign right of
each people to choose their social system at their own
discretion are the most important prerequisites for a
process leading to a normal Europe
The social and
political order in some countries did change in the past,
and it can change in the future as well, but this is a
matter for the people themselves, and of their choosing.
Any interference in the internal affairs, any attempt to
limit the sovereignty of another state--f riend and ally,
or any other--would be inadmissible.
The philosophy
behind the concept of a common European home excludes
the likelihood of an armed clash and the very possibility
of the use or threat of force, above all military
force "14
.

.

Although this was

a

strong statement with concerning the

"separate road to socialism" question, the initial signal for

change in the Soviet Union came much earlier.

Gorbachev

stated that at the April 1985 Plenary Meeting the "concrete
strategy for further economic development and a plan of
action" was initiated.

The ultimate goal was overall

economic improvement
in a
"The principle priorities are known to lie
in
economy,
the
of
reorganization
profound structural
technologies,
new
in
base,
material
its
reconstruction of
in investment policy changes, and in high management
.

.

.

standards "15
.

Change was not to be limited to merely the economic sector.
A radical change throughout Soviet society was to begin.

19

Gorbachev wrote that
"The economy has been and remains our main concern.
But
at the same time we have set about changing the moral and
psychological situation in society. We have come to the
conclusion that unless we activate the human factor
.it will be impossible for us to accomplish any of
the tasks set, or to change the situation in the
.

country

.

"
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Gorbachev's campaign for perestroika is a call for

extensive departures from prevailing practices and norms.
His tenure as leader of the Soviet Union has been

characterized by his pragmatic rather than ideological
approach to social, political, economic, and international
problems.

This is reflected somewhat in the change from his

original rhetoric that called for acceleration,
to the focus on restructuring,

economics and society.

(

perestroika

,

(u skorenie)

r

of Soviet

The need for radical change drove

decisions due to the complexity of the problems faced by the
Soviet Union.

By the January 1987 Plenum of the Central

Committee it became evident that economic progress and social
renewal ultimately depended upon political democratization.
The openness or

(

glasnost

designed to include
life.

Glasnost

a

)

aspect of the "new thinking" was

more educated middle class in public

can be considered a symbol of trust, and

reflects the leadership's change in political outlook that

only a small elite, or vanguard could be trusted with the
truth.

Tatyana Zaslavskaya wrote that "the truth cannot be

hidden if one is to expect cooperation" [from the populace]

Gorbachev went to great lengths to address mistakes made in
20

the past by Stalin and other Soviet leaders.

An example is

the rehabilitations of "nonpersons" like Nicolai Bukharin.

Some parts of perestroika can be tied to the 1983

Novosibirsk Economic Report, which addressed the fact that
the structure of industry had changed since the 1930s and

that this system was obsolete and an obstacle to economic

developments.

The Soviet Union under the leadership of

Mikhail Gorbachev has identified the myriad of political and

economic problems that plague the country and has begun the
slow painstaking process of economic revitalization.

It has

combined this process with more "openness" in Soviet society,
an acknowledgement of past mistakes by Soviet leadership,

and

closer political and economic cooperation with Western Europe
and the United States
For the Stalinist leadership in Prague Gorbachev's new

thinking was anathema.

The ideas and proposals that

Gorbachev espoused were painfully similar to those of the
Prague Spring and contradicted the Czechoslovak normalization
program.

Consequently, the Czechoslovak leadership

was left

not knowing how to respond to the radical shift in Soviet

policies. Despite public statements to the contrary, neither

Gustav Husak nor Milos Jakes fully accepted "Gorbachevian"
reform measures, nor did they carry out implement substantive
reforms that would address needed economic problems. The

Czechoslovak government finally announced support for reform
and cautiously embarked on an economic reform.
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This process of reform or renewal did not begin

immediately in Czechoslovakia.

As a direct result of Soviet

action during the Prague Spring, the leadership in Prague was
first openly hostile to implementing the reforms advocated

by Gorbachev, and only after it realized that Gorbachev was

going to retain power

did the Czech regime begin

"experimenting" with Soviet-style reforms.

22

CHAPTER

2

THE REACTION TO PERESTROIKA

From 1985 to 1989 the Communist regime, led first by

Gustav Husak, and then by Milos Jakes remained

the most

politically repressive regime in East-Central Europe
excluding Romania.

The reaction to Gorbachev's promotion of

perestroika and glasnost by most members of the Czechoslovak
leadership was negative despite official statements to the

contrary that appeared in Rude Pravo, Radio Prague
sources.

and other

,

Perestroika and glasnost were diametric opposites

of the Czechoslovak "normalization" policy,

government never actually figured
Soviet thinking,

"

a

and the Communist

way to accept the "new

maintain strict adherence to Marxist-

Leninist orthodoxy, address growing economic and political
problems, and sustain its legitimacy simultaneously.

Czechoslovak reaction to Soviet reforms moved over

a

The

period

of several years from a position of absolute negativity to

one of reluctant acquiescence.

Even this was only in the

economic sector
Neil Malcolm wrote that for years the Soviet Union

sought to maintain tight control over Eastern Europe for

three reasons.
were:

The three justifications for this policy

the region was viewed as a vital part of the "world

socialist economy,

"

it provided evidence of the vitality and

potential expansion of the Soviet system, which, in turn,
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bolstered the domestic authority and foreign prestige of the
Soviet Union,

lastly,

it was

perceived as an indespensible

security asset that would ensure the division of Germany and
a

buffer zone between the Soviet Union and NATO.

Gorbachev

realized that these three elements of Soviet foreign policy

toward East-Central Europe needed modification to reinforce
his policies of perestroika and glasnost

the Soviet position toward these states.

,

and began changing
His foreign policy

became more flexible toward the area and both directly and
indirectly encouraged similar changes for it

.

Very early

after Gorbachev attained power questions emerged regarding
the "limits of reform" in East-Central Europe.

Initially,

the main question was whether the Soviet Union would allow

similar changes in East-Central Europe despite the

possibility of these changes going beyond what the Soviet
government planned.

This question has moved from one about

the reform of a socialist model to one of how to implement a

market economy largely due to Gorbachev's initial shift in
foreign policy toward the area.

It was

Gorbachev who started

the pendulum swinging in the direction of reform in the

Soviet Union, and this overlapped into East-Central Europe.
The Czechoslovak government showed no sign of allowing

political liberalization or tolerance of political dissent
and was a major reason the Communist regime collapsed in

November/December 1989.

The Czechoslovak Communist Party
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went from not reacting to not having the ability to react
fast enough to increasing and unrelenting demands for

political change.
While the Czechoslovak government hedged, stalled, and
finally plodded along with some limited economic change, the
Soviet Union proceeded with proposals for democratization and
an array of economic programs,

laws,

and procedures that

resembled closely the Czech Action Program of the Prague
Spring.

(*See Appendix

1)

The Soviet Union, which was the

very model upon which the Czechoslovak system was based,
began to change.

In both domestic and international politics

Gorbachev relied less on ideology and more on pragmatic
decision making and diplomacy.

The Czechoslovak government

was left puzzled about how to deal with such radical shifts
in policies from the

"center of empire."

The most visible reaction to Gorbachev's policies by the

Czechoslovak leadership was in economics.

It would be

incorrect to say that the Czechoslovak economic planners
"used" the Soviet ideas of perestroika as a model, but it

could be argued that more pragmatic economists such as
Lubomir Strougal were encouraged by Moscow's reform posture
and at least the possibility of a structural reform.

They

could point to Soviet changes as evidence for a need to

address local economic difficulties, and thereby challenge
the party "hardliners."

What happened gradually was a split

between two groups that can be called as "normalizers" like
25

Vasil Bilak and Alois Indra and "pragmatists" such as
Leopold

Valtr Komarek, and Lubomir Strougal.

Ler,

The "pragmatists"

concerned themselves less with ideology and more with dealing
with the growing economic difficulties of the Czechoslovak

system
Just four months after Gorbachev came to power Gustav

Husak announced at the Czechoslovak Central Committee meeting
that ;
"We will not take the road of any of the market oriented
concepts that would weaken the system of socialist
collective property and the party's leading role in the
economy.
We have had a bad experience with that kind of

thing

.

17

This statement illustrated two important points, the
first was that despite a new leader in the Kremlin who was

proposing
agenda,

a radically new political,

social, and economic

it did not automatically spell similar changes for

Czechoslovakia.

Secondly,

it illustrated the fact that the

regime hesitated enacting any type of reform mainly due to
Very

the adverse historical experience of the Prague Spring.

early it was evident that the Czechoslovak leadership was
fearful of a "return to 1968."

Their belief was that once

economic reforms were adopted there would be popular demands
for more "liberal" political reform in other sectors.

This

of course would be unacceptable to those occupying Hradcany

Castle.

This trepidation regarding a "return to 1968" guided

the outlook and position of the Czechoslovak government until
it was

replaced by the Civic Forum government in 1989.
26

There was speculation from Western analysts that during

Husak's meeting with Gorbachev in May of 1985 Husak must have

convinced the new Soviet leader that a continuation of the

normalization policy that Czechoslovakia had been following
since the aftermath of the Prague Spring was necessary.
"Husak visited the Soviet leader at the end of May and a
reiteration of the anti-reformist policy must now be
presumed to have been cleared by Moscow
.Husak's
plea for a continuation rather than innovation must have
been convincing enough to be accepted in Moscow." 18
.

.

The Czechoslovak reaction may have also been influenced

by some of Gorbachev's statements regarding Solidarity in

Poland and the Kadar regime in Hungary.

On the one hand,

Gorbachev stated that there would be "no new Solidarity-like"
institutions formulated in the bloc, while he spoke favorably
of the Hungarian reform efforts.

Although the Solidarity

issue was more politically charged than the Hungarian one, it

pointed to the fact that at least initially, Gorbachev
probably lacked aaffected clear picture of how to deal with
the rest of the bloc, and at least not formulated a uniform

foreign policy line toward East-Central Europe.
turn,

This,

in

could have impacted negatively on the Czech decision
The Czechoslovak leadership

about whether or not to reform.

probably felt that lunging into

a

reform was unnecessary.

Obviously it would not make much sense for Gorbachev to
destabilize the Czechoslovak regime that had

a

precarious

legitimacy at best by insisting upon rapid change.
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Gorbachev

was probably waiting to solidify his power base at home

before enacting sweeping changes and demanding a "break with
the past" from others.

There is another point to be made in that if perestroika
was going to succeed it needed "support" from the Soviet

Union's major trading partners, e.g., the Council for Mutual

Economic Assistance (CMEA) countries.

They,

in turn would

have to modify their policies to realign themselves not only

ideologically, but also economically with the Soviet Union.
Lastly, East-Central Europe had seen a similar Soviet

reformer before in the persona of Nikita Khrushchev.

The

Czechoslovak regime did not want to repeat the mistake of
introducing a reform that might go beyond the Soviet limits
(whatever those were)

.

The conservatives in Czechoslovakia

sought to wait out the Soviet leader.

They wanted to see

whether he would either be driven from power or if he would

modify his position.

The "wait and see" policy adopted by

the Czechoslovak leadership led,

in part,

to its ouster.

In 1985 Czechoslovakia was intolerant of any political

dissent or challenge to the Communist Party whether real or
imagined.

Members of Charter 77 like Jiri Dienstbier and

Vaclav Havel were watched closely by the police, and often
jailed for "hooliganism."

Rude' Pravo continued its diatribe

against the Catholic Church by increasing anti-church
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propaganda for the 1,100th anniversary of the death of St.
Methodius.

A letter sent by the Pope for the event was

referred to as "a threat to the socialist consciousness."
In economics,

Gustav Husak merely issued bland

statements requesting more "resolute actions" by the party
while offering no tangible solutions.

There were some

economists that could see the need for economic change, and
among these was Valtr Komarek, who, in the journal Politicka

Ekonomie wrote that

a

fundamental change in economics was

needed and that the present "extensive" model, dating back to
post World War II was an anachronism.

Komarek maintained

that part of Czechoslovakia's economic problem was its

continued concentration on heavy industry.

One of his

suggestions was to transfer resources to other sectors.
regime, however, had no desire to follow Komarek

suggestions.

In July,

The

'

Husak flatly denied that

Czechoslovakia would embark on similar reforms.

Further

statements made by the Chairman of the State Planning
Commission, Svatopluk Potac, were indicative of negativism to

economic change.

Potac was quoted as having said that;

"during the next five year plan Czechoslovakia would take
no risks and that some people might call this
conservative, but we call it stable, dynamic

development

.
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Early in 1986 conservatives in the Czechoslovak regime

redoubled their efforts in denouncing promoters of Soviet
style reforms by raising the spectre of the Prague Spring of
1968.

The most prominent and most outspoken anti-reformer
29

was Vasil Bilak, the Communist Party's leading ideologist.

Bilak epitomized strict Marxist— Leninist orthodoxy and

opposed any departure from it.
the

His position was derived from

Lessons from the Crisis in Party and Society after the

13th CPCz Congress 1966."

This document was the backbone of

the normalization program and Bilak sought strict adherence
to it.

Specific guidelines included:

the guarantee of the

leading role of the Party, the state acting as an instrument
of the dictatorship of the proletariat, Marxist-Leninist

orthodoxy reigning supreme to the exclusion of every other
view,

collective ownership and central planning, and

proletarian internationalism, especially with regard to the
USSR.

Throughout the early months of 1986 up to the XVIIth CPCz
Congress, Bilak continually denounced any thought of reform

and asserted that the solution to the problems faced by

Czechoslovakia in economics "lay in precisely the opposite
direction."

He felt that more planning was needed,

and an

emphasis should be placed on "the human factor."
Evidence of anti-reform manifested itself at the XVIIth

Party Congress.

Husak and others commented critically

regarding the Soviet XXVIIth Party Congress which was held
one month earlier.

In one of Husak 's speeches he said that;

"We follow what they are doing in the Soviet Union and
?0
look for our own solutions."
•
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This was a polite signal to the Soviet leadership that

Czechoslovakia would not adopt the Soviet model.

It was at

this Soviet Congress that Gorbachev spoke for over five hours

about perestroika

advocating "sweeping changes" and radical

r

economic reform.

His proposals included:

more autonomy for

local farm and plant managers, a revision of the entire

pricing system,

revision of the food tax that had been in

a

effect during the 1921-29 period, and placing operations on a
more self supporting basis.

He assured the congress that

these measures and others like them were not a retreat from
socialism, but an improvement in it.

This view was not

shared by the Prague leadership.

Although Husak said that his regime was "not afraid of
reforms" and that "We follow what they are doing in the
Soviet Union and we look for our own solutions,

"

it did not

look like genuine reform would be undertaken by the Prague

leadership.

Radio Free Europe Research pointed out that;

"It now seems certain that the Czechoslovak leadership has
not chosen to follow the Soviet example in enforcing

large scale personnel changes in party districts and
91
regions, nor in the ministries."
,

...

It also wrote that any mention of reform was couched in

language that left no doubt about the regime's vigilance

towards improvement, rejection of market solutions and

weakening of the leading role of the Party.

Husak'

s

a

speech

at the XVI Ith Party Congress concentrated on two main points:

an improvement in planning,

and economic growth acceleration.
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A striking feature of his speech was that the word
"reform"
was used at all.

It had

disappeared from the political

vocabulary during the normalization period and its usage was
considered taboo.

However, the fact that Husak used the term

illustrated the fact that the regime might be willing to

modify its position.
Whereas Gorbachev launched into perestroika by

eliminating some elements of the bureaucracy and replacing
"conservatives" in the highest governing organs, none of this

happened in Czechoslovakia preceding, during, or immediately
after the XVIIth Congress.

No one lost their posts in either

the Presidium or the secretariat

"Compared to the remarkably fresh notes struck at the
XXVIIth Congress of the CPSU just concluded in Moscow,
the Prague Party event mainly distinguished itself by its
lassitude and its caution.
So far, everything stayed the
way it was 22
.

The Economist wrote that;

"...formidable obstacles in the entrenched economic and
political ideological apparatus remain, and a really
effective reform, which would signal an important
departure in post-1968 Czechoslovakia looks unlikely at
present because it would require more extensive political
changes than the Husak regime can tolerate." 23
An official shift in Czechoslovak economic policy came in

December 1986 when, at
the CPCz

,

a

session of the Central Committee of

Husak announced the government's intention of

carrying out

a Soviet

style "restructuring."
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In January 1987

the basic principles of this restructuring program were

published by Hospodar ske Noviny

The document on

restructuring was titled; "The Concret ization of the
Principles of Restructuring of the Economic Mechanism of the
CSSR,

"

and contained 37 principles.

Although this document

suggested that the regime was making some progress away from

orthodoxy since there was

a

proposed shift in the

relationship between central agencies and enterprises.

There

was no plan to implement mechanisms to effect proposed

changes
One of the most significant points of the restructuring

document was that central planning bodies were to concentrate
on the strategic issues of

balance,

modernization, overall economic

and regional development.

It was

reported that the

extent of central administrative direction would be reduced

"drastically

.

A second important feature of this document was it

contained

proposal for a law on Socialist Enterprises. It

a

provided that enterprises would be fully self sufficient, and
would no longer receive subsidies.

Enterprises would become

the "basic economic units" responsible for planning their own

development

.

They would have more control in shaping their

internal structure and links with their partners and their

emphasis would become addressing societal needs.

In addition

to the above, planning organizations would establish binding,
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long term objectives called "normatives

.

"

These were a range

of a given performance indicator within which companies

operate rather than having to meet a definite target.
By looking at this document outside of historical

context,

it could be inferred that the Czechoslovak regime

had embraced some Soviet style economic reforms.

However,

upon closer scrutiny this assumption is not entirely

accurate

Radio Free Europe Research wrote that;
"It is virtually inconceivable that Gustav Husak's and
Vasil Bilak's "normalization" regime would be capable of
carrying out a major reform of the present day orthodox

system

.
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They further wrote that the document must, above all, be seen
as the regime's response to the need to assimilate

Gorbachev's new philosophy.

Failure to respond could have

prompted the Kremlin to demand personnel changes at the top.
The attempt made by the Czechoslovak government to "mimic"

Gorbachevism even though it had no intention of embracing
substantive reforms was viewed as a way to survive.
The document did not deal with the most pertinent
issues, which were identified as the restructuring of the

central planning and ministerial bureaucracies, and the fact
that even though a "drastic" reduction in central direction
was announced,

there was no indication of how the power of

entrenched bureaucracies would be reduced.
34

The "Principles"

illustrate the desirability of identifying non-productive

enterprises and industries, however, it does not mention the

abolishing of "justified social security" of workers.

This

meant that the regime would not approve of measures that

would lead to unemployment.

As a consequence,

no genuine

industrial restructuring could be carried out because it

would close inefficient factories and other non-productive
enterprises, thus generating some unemployment.
By early 1987 there was evidence of polarization in the

Czechoslovak leadership concerning Czechoslovakia's process
of change.

Lubomir Strougal began to criticize the caution

of the normalization period by attributing it to an

"inadequate level of knowledge" and "our rigid and dogmatic

view of several theoretical problems of political economy."
He

issued statements seeking

economic policies.

a

revision of the regime's

These incorporated "positive" elements of

the 1968 program of reforms, which, offered some form of

rehabilitation of the 1968 program.

Regarding the 13th

Congress of the CPCz, Strougal said that;
"...it contained a number of valuable elements that could
?s
be used and developed in practice."
•

•

Strougal began using the words "reform" and

"restructuring" interchangeably in some of his speeches, and
he drew comparisons between the planned Czechoslovak reform

and Gorbachev's restructuring efforts in the Soviet Union.
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It is not at all accidental that the concept of
our
reform is in its basic features identical with the aims
pursued also by the Soviet comrades in their
restructuring. 26

Two distinct factions operated inside the Czechoslovak

leadership.

Lubomir Strougal and other economists promoted

genuine economic reform (within socialism)

,

while Vasil Bilak

and other conservatives remained opposed to substantive

change

.

Husak seems to have chosen the middle course at

first but at last realized that the pressure from the Soviet

Union for change was too great and began to endorse

"Gorbachevian" reforms for Czechoslovakia.

It is no

accident, however, that Husak asserted that Czechoslovakia

would follow the Soviet lead and effect the biggest changes
in economic management since the period of nationalization in

the post World War II era less than one month before

Gorbachev was due to arrive in Prague for

a state visit

Some analysts concluded that Husak was simply paying lip

service to Gorbachev's policies in order to appease the
Soviet leader, and thereby retain power.

Evidence supports

the fact that the Czechoslovak regime was inclined to attempt
some economic reforms, but nothing to the extent of those

being proposed and enacted in the Soviet Union.

The

Economist Intelligence Unit reported that the basic outline
of reform was similar to the current Soviet one,

Czechoslovak example in the 1960s.

and the

Focus was upon enterprise

autonomy, ending central directive planning, granting some
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foreign trade rights to enterprises, and some small private

enterprise.

Despite the leadership's promotion of economic

reform, opposition to reform came from three areas:

ideological opponents from within the Communist Party, the

conservative state apparatus, and an apathetic and cynical
workforce.

The overall trend into the late 1980s was that

economic growth fell well below the

Table

3

.

5% yearly targets

Economic Growth Percents 1986-1989

1:

1986

2

1987

2.2

1988

2.3

1989

1

.

.

These figures represent Net Material Product

(NMP

)

They do not include health, education, public administration,
defense, banking, hotels, and personal services.

The Economist Intelligence Unit also stated that there was

evidence in the consumer goods and heavy engineering sectors
of concealed inflation.

"Enterprises present marginal improvements as radically
new products for which they are allowed by central
authorities to charge higher prices, giving the
appearance in the statistics of an increase in output.
When these factors are taken into account, growth in the
27
1980s may appear to have been an illusion."
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Even though the Czechoslovak government viewed

Gorbachev's policies negatively, the popular reaction was
quite different.

Many people were hopeful that Gorbachev

would be a catalyst for political change.

Dissidents

expressed both hope and skepticism about Gorbachev.

There

was no debating the popular reaction to Gorbachev during his

visit in April 1987.

The general public in Czechoslovakia

cheered the Soviet leader in a genuine and spontaneous show
of affection.

Even prior to Gorbachev's visit, the Czechoslovak public

showed a great deal of interest in what was happening inside
the Soviet Union.

Newspapers and journals carrying excerpts

from Gorbachev's speeches and the new management proposals of

perestroika

were sold out immediately.

Hans Renner stated

that various Czechoslovak dissidents, and particularly the

ex-reformists, began to compare the reforms in the Soviet

Union with the reform process at the time of the Prague
Spring
"They saw a kindred spirit in Gorbachev, somebody striving
for the same goals in Moscow which they themselves had
tried to realize in Prague twenty years earlier." °
The comparison was not limited to only Czechoslovak

observers.

An article from the Christian Science Monitor

wrote that
the
"Many of the substantive reforms are very similar:
day
to
economic changes; reducing the party's role in day
public
management; a more significant legislature; freer
debate; and a more independent legal system." 29
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Charles Gati reinforced the point about popular

expectations in Czechoslovakia when he stated that:
"Czechoslovakia is an anachronism in Gorbachev's world of
reform and renewal
.people in Prague hope that
Gorbachev's Moscow Spring, whose origins they often trace
to Dubcek s Prague Spring, will produce beneficial
changes in Czechoslovakia." 30
.

.

'

Gorbachev spoke with people in the streets of Prague, and
was greeted with cheers,

waving Soviet flags.

red carnations, and Czechoslovaks

It was probably the most

response from the Czechoslovak people to
the history of the country.

a

enthusiastic

Soviet leader in

The Western Press reported that

there were comments from the crowd such as:
hope" and "We want him to stay."

"He is our only

One woman interviewed by

McLean's reflected the skepticism of some when she said;
"He will have enough trouble implementing his own program
at home, never mind here!" 31

Although members of Charter

77 were

disappointed that

the topics of 1968 and the prospect of Soviet troops

withdrawals were not addressed, some, like Jiri Hajek,

Czechoslovakia's former Foreign Minister, viewed the visit
positively, and expressed 'cautious optimism' for future
reforms in Czechoslovakia.

During this visit Gorbachev reinforced the notion that
there could be some flexibility in the bloc with regard to

foreign and domestic policies.

Gorbachev widened the margin

for autonomous action by other members of the bloc saying
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"no communist party has a monopoly on the truth" .32

Czechoslovak government never took this as

a

The

sign that they

might begin to implement meaningful and substantive reforms.
Some "tinkering" went on with the economy, but the most

important change for Czechoslovakia came late in the year.
On December 17,

at the 7th Session of the CPCz Central

Committee meeting, Gustav Husak was released from his duties
as Secretary General and took the ceremonial post of

President of the Republic.

Milos Jakes replaced Husak and

almost immediately reported that the change in leadership did
not mean that party policies would be changed.

During Jakes tenure from December 1987 to December 1989,
two main currents dominated the political situation in

Czechoslovakia.

First,

rising social unrest and frustration

with a regime that was almost wholly unresponsive to societal
needs increased substantially.

Secondly, the regime fought

the increasing demands for both religious freedom, and

"glasnost" by using police coercion and harassment of those

individuals or groups that dared speak out

.

The Czechoslovak

regime under Milos Jakes sought to maintain tight control on

society while absolutely refusing to tolerate any challenge
to the leading role of the communist party.

Part of the reason for the increase in dissident

activity, protests, and religious gatherings was due to the
fact that 1988 was an important anniversary year in

Czechoslovak history.

It was the 20th

anniversary of

the Prague Spring, the 40th anniversary of the communist
40

takeover, the 50th anniversary of the Munich Agreement, and
the 70th anniversary of independence.

For the Prague

leadership the most difficult of these dates to deal with was
the 1968 Prague Spring.

Throughout the year they spent

considerable effort in denying that it was similar to reforms

being proposed in Czechoslovakia and denouncing those that
were involved in the Prague Spring; like Alexander Dubcek
The effort to distance the current "reform" from the one in
1968 began in earnest early in January.

Radio Prague said

that any comparison of perestroika with events of 1968 was
"an offense to truth and human reason."

that

Rude Pravo wrote

;

"people pretending to support 'restructuring' are
comparing the CPCz Central Committee effort of 1968 to
" 33
These cases are incomparable
today.
.

.

.

The Jakes regime was extremely reluctant to reassess the

events of the Prague Spring due to the fact that it derived
its legitimacy from the repudiation of the Prague Spring and

from the normalization policies that followed after it had

been suppressed.

The party, under the leadership of Milos

Jakes, never reconciled this fact with the populace, and the

two years of his rule were marked with protests,

demonstrations, and widespread popular support for adopting

Soviet-style reforms.
The Jakes regime made no attempts to coordinate economic

change with political change.
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In sharp contrast to

Gorbachev, the CPCz sought to "revive" the economy without

political concessions.

Radio Prague and Rude Pravo were

replete with statements stressing that economic reforms did
not mean more leeway for dissidents, and that in no way would

political opposition be legalized.

Czechoslovakia's economic

situation continually worsened while the regime hesitated

implementing major reforms.

Ladislav Adamec, the new Prime

Minister assessed the economic situation as "grim."

The

growth rates of both national income and the overall economy
did not reach targeted levels, while the earlier

experimentation with a few hundred enterprises produced
little reason for optimism.

There was no significant retreat

from central planning methods.

Czechoslovakia also suffered

from its own investment policies.

It

continued to produce

heavy machinery for sale in the Soviet Union.

However, the

Soviets were cancelling foreign orders as part of its own

reform effort.

Czechoslovakia actually ran a trade deficit

with noncommunist countries in the first three quarters of
1988

.

The Party's solution to these problems was a call for

increased reorganization and "activism" under its control.
The CPCz Central Committee meeting on April 8-9,

1988

increased rhetoric demanding the mobilization of society, and
the party, but announced no genuine implementation of a

reform.

The CPCz rejected the idea that the party should

reduce its role in economic decision-making, and although
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some changes in party personnel took place,

it did not change

the overall economic policy. Vladimir Kusin wrote that;
"The CPCz continues to follow the reformist track that
carries the least risk of political change, and rests on
economic reorganization combined with enforced
invigoration of the party." 34
The regime seemed content with a slow pace of economic

change

.

In October Radio Free Europe Research pointed out

that very few of the elements of Soviet perestroika and

glasnost had been transported to Czechoslovakia.

In that

same month Jakes gave a speech at the CPCz Central Committee

Plenum indicating that there would be no acceleration of
reformist plans.

Lubomir Strougal, the leading voice for

genuine Soviet-style reforms lost his position as Prime

Minister and was replaced by Ladislav Adame c

.

This indicated

that the conservative element in the Czechoslovak leadership

had prevailed and that Jakes was able to reinforce his

leadership team.

Although the prospects for any real economic

restructuring were dim during this period, the prospects for
tolerance of dissent or opposition by the regime were almost
non-existent.

Steady economic deterioration contributed to

the increase in human rights activities and political dissent

during 1988-1989.

The regime was more than willing to use

force to assert its domination over Czechoslovak society.
One noteworthy development for Czechoslovakia were the

increasing religious demands of Roman Catholics
became one of the only alternatives, an
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Religion

.

"escape

1

really,

for

a

politically repressed, and apathetic society.

The

government recognized this fact, and increased its steps to
thwart efforts of secular leaders to provide for the people
who wanted spiritual relief.

Christians in Czechoslovakia

continued to be exposed to strong anti-religious propaganda
and persecution.

Cardinal Tomasek was not allowed to publish

his works inside Czechoslovakia.

The government refused to

allow the Vatican to take part in assigning clergy to fill
vacancies.

In some cases ones that were filled were not

allowed to practice.

Popular priests were often transferred

or were harassed in other ways

"Priests responsible for driving up to nine parishes lost
their driver's licenses for alcoholism from the wine used
during Holy Communion". 35
Some religious believers like Augustin Navratil, the author
of the 31 point petition for more religious freedom, were

interrogated and assigned to psychiatric clinics.

On March

6

over 8000 Catholics attended a mass at St. Vitus Cathedral in

Prague to honor Blessed Agnes of Bohemia.

The Czech secret

police detained various political and religious activists,
and banned them from attending the mass.

Among these were:

Charter 77 activist Vaclav Havel, Catholic leaders Vaclav
Benda and Vaclav Maly, and members of a music organization

called the Jazz Section;

Karel Srp, and Cestmir Hunat

Later in March a religious demonstration in Bratislava by
several thousand Slovak Catholics was broken up by riot

police
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Demonstrations and gatherings were not limited to
®

igions occasions

.

On August 21 1988/

10, 000

people

gathered to commemorate the 20th anniversary of the crushing
of the Prague Spring.

On October 28,

5,000 people marched in

Prague to commemorate the 40th anniversary of Czechoslovak
independence.

On December 10,

4,000 people gathered for

International Human Rights Day.

In each case the crowds were

met by truncheon wielding riot police.

Independent political activity rose during 1988 and 1989
and various groups increasingly criticized the regime.
"Until the beginning of 1988, active opposition to the
Czechoslovak regime had been limited to several dissident
groups whose impact
.had been rather limited." 36
.

.

Radio Free Europe Research pointed out that there were
about twenty dissident associations in Czechoslovakia,

covering

a wide

variety of ideas and political philosophies.

Two main sources of "recruits" for the new dissident groups
came largely from Roman Catholics, who increasingly demanded

more religious freedom, and disenchanted youth.
"There is growing resentment and an increasing
willingness among Roman Catholics to demand their rights
.more than 600,000 of them signed a petition for more
religious freedom in 1988. 37
.

.

In the demonstrations that had taken place on August 21,

October 28, and December

10,

many of the demonstrators were

younger people who had not previously belonged to any formal
dissident group.
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In April 1988,

an organization called the Independent

Peace Association distributed samizdat literature calling for
"a

demilitarized socialism, and greater openness in all areas

of life."

Less than a year later a "club" comprised of

former senior party officials was formed in Prague, titled:

Obroda

(renewal)

A Club for Socialist Restructuring."

:

This group consisted of some people who had acted in the

Prague Spring and included:

Cestmir Cisar, the Chairman of

the Czech National Council and Secretary of the CPCz

Presidium in 1968, Jiri Hajek, the former Foreign Minister,
Vojtek Mencl, the former commanding officer of the Military
Political Academy in Prague, as well as some signatories of
Charter 77.

Their declaration contained praise for both

Dubcek's policies formulated in the Action program of 1968 as
well as for Gorbachev's reforms in the Soviet Union.

It

discussed the political, economic, and moral crisis in
Czechoslovakia, and expressed concern regarding the lack of

reform
"If the attempts at "restructuring" remain confined to
.marginal problems of the system while preserving the
.we fear that stagnation
party's monopoly on power
The communist party must show
and decline will continue.
a more profoundly democratic attitude in economy,
.

.

.

politics, and ideology.

.

o o

°

Naturally the official reaction to this group was
completely negative.

Jakes dismissed the group as people

seeking "their own rehabilitation as well as that of their
[1968]

policies."

Rude Pravo criticized the formation of the

group, and described the members as "rightist opportunists
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who advocated the overthrow of the existing political

system."

This group caused embarrassment for the regime due

to the fact that they not only claimed to support socialism,

but they also openly declared their support for Gorbachev.

Criticism of the regime's policies in Slovakia came from
the Slovak literary weekly, Literarny Tyzdennik

.

Its

articles reflected impatience with the slow pace of reform
and criticized those who created "attitudinal,

organizational, and institutional structures that lead to

general stagnation in society ".
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a

It further reported that

the stagnation was rooted in the Brezhnev era.
Just prior to the upheaval that would remove the

communist party from power, the party attempted to define its
stand and justify the slow pace of reform.

Jan Fojtik, the

chief ideologist of the Communist Party,

(who had replaced

Vasil Bilak) gave a speech arguing for

"well thought out"

a

gradual process of change which would be implemented by a
single party leadership. They would move ahead slowly in

order to avoid problems that the Soviet Union, Hungary, and

Poland were faced with; eg. inflation, unemployment.
"Fojtik argued that perestroika was necessary because new
conditions required new approaches, but it would be
wrong to return to capitalist exploitation in pursuing it
.political stability and economic balance were
40
preferable to haste and experimentation ."
.

.

Fojtik said that the CPCz welcomed change in the Soviet
Union, and explained that Czechoslovakia would be influenced
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by changes in other countries in the socialist commonwealth,
but denied that Czechoslovakia needed to strictly follow

Soviet guidelines.

Fojtik's remarks indicated that the

regime was attempting to present itself as

a

supporter of

reforms, but that any reforms would be controlled by the

communist party.
Throughout 1988 and 1989 the Jakes regime paid pretended
interest to the idea of perestroika and glasnost occurring
inside Czechoslovakia, while

Communist Party.

repressing opposition to the

It did not pursue "radical reform"

economic sector, nor did it establish

a

in the

concrete agenda for

tending to the various economic problems that the country was
facing.

These economic problems when combined with the

regime’s intolerance of dissent or opposition led directly to
the crisis situation in late 1989.

The regime could never

reconcile itself with the Prague Spring.

This resulted in

not only the loss of its legitimacy, but also the complete

loss of confidence in the regime's ability to manage society

by the general public.

On January 17 1989 a large

demonstration gathered in Prague and demanded "Free
elections, Gorbachev,

freedom, the removal of Jakes, and the

release of Vaclav Havel."
The transformation of the country had begun which would,

by the end of the year, remove Jakes, make Havel the

President, promise genuine elections, and move the country
far beyond what Gorbachev would have envisioned for a
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"Czechoslovak perestroika."

After having outlined in some detail the actions of the

Czechoslovak government in light of perestroika and glasnost
the question becomes "Why, and how did Communism collapse in

this country?"

Although there are several key factors

involved which have shaped the transformation from a

politically repressive, economically inefficient country to
"a more civil society,

Mikhail Gorbachev.

"

the most important of these was

His implementation of the dual policies

of perestroika and glasnost in the Soviet Union, as well as
a

shift in Soviet foreign policy and national security policy

were of major import in making the transformation of

Czechoslovakia possible.

Timothy Colton wrote that;

"Forty years after WWII Soviet politicians still conceive
of their policies toward Eastern Europe, and even the
internal affairs of the six countries as an extension of

Soviet domestic policy ." 41
This type of thinking began to change with the advent of

Gorbachev.

The day after he became Secretary General he

indicated that his "first commandment" would be

a

strengthening of relations with the East European countries.
Judging from his primary desire to reinvigorate the Soviet
economy, this strengthening was probably designed to reshape

economic practices throughout the CMEA countries.

Gorbachev wanted to move away from

a

Although

Stalinist economic model

and encouraged his allies to do the same, he never envisioned
such a radical change from them.
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But by advocating more

"openness" and an acknowledgment of past mistakes, Gorbachev

also risked destabilizing his Warsaw Pact allies.

Historically, the Soviet Union sought stability and

conformity from these countries.

In the end,

sacrificed stability in favor of change.
make socialism workable.

Gorbachev

His goal was to

The end result, at least in East-

Central Europe, was the successful challenge and defeat of
this model by the cives.

William Luers includes St. Agnes, St. Wenceslaus, Tomas
Masaryk, the Muses, the Dalai Lama, Pope John Paul II, Vaclav
Havel, and Mikhail Gorbachev in his "long and eclectic" list
of who destroyed communism in Czechoslovakia.

He stated,

however, that the person who started it was Mikhail

Gorbachev
"The ideas underpinning the clean sweep of the communist
dominion in Eastern Europe flowed without question from
perestroika and glasnost." 42

Luers made the point that although the earlier events in
East Germany of waves of people leaving via Hungary and

Czechoslovakia caught the attention of young Czechs and
Slovaks, while also opening their minds to the potential for
"mass action," that without Gorbachev, the "mass action"

would have met the same fate as Hungary in 1956, and

Czechoslovakia in 1968.
The decisive factor was that Gorbachev's policies

directly impacted on the other major reasons why communism

collapsed in the area.

In short,
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dissent, protests,

lack of

interest in Marxist-Leninism by these countries and
an

increased role of religion were not enough to "topple
the
regimes."

The local communist governments could deal with

these "threats."

What they could not defend against was the

rapidly changing Soviet agenda which encouraged certain
elements of these "forces," namely; students, intellectuals,
and disenfranchised communists to challenge these regimes.
This,

coupled with the fact that no Soviet troops would be

used against the increasing waves of demonstrators, led to
the collapse of communism.

"Ultimately they left power because they were
demoralized.
Then, unable to use military force in the
face of overwhelming masses of demonstrations, they
became powerless." 4 ^
1989 was an extremely important year for the people of

East-Central Europe.

No one predicted the rapidity with

which the Communist governments of East Germany,
Czechoslovakia, and Romania would collapse.

The consequences

of Communism's collapse are now being felt not only in East-

Central Europe, but in the West as well.

There are new

economic markets for western investment and the opportunity
of the East-Central European states to integrate more with

their western neighbors by entering the European Economic
Community, as well as changing the roles of NATO and the WTO.
To scholars familiar with the history, politics, and

culture of the region, the words; "exhilarating," "ironic,"
even "unbelievable" barely shed light on the remarkable
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transformation of the area.
Czechoslovakia from

a

The transformation of

repressive, authoritarian regime to a

democratic and pluralist society happened so quickly
that
analysis of the decision making process and activities
from
groups such as the Civic Forum and Public Against Violence
have only now begun to appear.

Part of the difficulty in

attempting an analysis of the events which removed the
Communist Party from power is the fact that since it is a
recent "phenomenon.”

Few in depth studies of book length do

not yet exist in great numbers

.

Although there are several

books that illustrate the events leading to the collapse,
this thesis has had to rely mainly upon journal and magazine

articles to provide analysis of events leading to the
transformation, the influence of the Soviet Union, and
lastly, what the policy objectives in politics and economics
of the new government in Czechoslovakia will be.

Even though

some articles cover the collapse of Communism, these tend to

concentrate not on the question of why these governments
collapsed, but rather,

going?

in what direction are these countries

Bearing these facts in mind, the analysis will now

illustrate the major factors of the "Velvet Revolution."
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CHAPTER

3

THE VELVET REVOLUTION

1989 was the year that Communism collapsed and,

Havel's words,

"the government

in

returned to the people."

The

new leadership of Czechoslovakia presents a case of supreme
irony,

illustrating not only change, but the speed with which

Communist rule ended.

The new Chairman of Parliament,

Alexander Dubcek, had, only weeks earlier been in
official exile as a forestry worker in Bratislava. The new

President of the country, dissident writer, and member of the

Charter 77 human rights group, Vaclav Havel had been jailed

repeatedly by both the Husak and Jakes regimes for his views
which were contrary to those of the regime.

Jiri Dienstbier,

also a member of Charter 77, went from coal stoker to foreign

minister in less than

a

month.

The termination of Communist rule came on December 11,

when a noncommunist government assumed power for the first
time in forty one years. The protests of thousands in

Wenceslaus Square, and the resignation of the Communist Party
leadership heralded the event.

However, even while being

assailed on all sides by popular opposition led mainly by
Civic Forum in the Czech lands, and Public Against Violence
in Slovakia,

the Communist Party attempted to retain power.

By replacing some of the hardliners,

including Jakes, the

Party attempted cosmetic changes in order to placate an
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increasingly dissatisfied public.

The Communist leadership

hoped that by offering a "third way,

"

that is, a "power

sharing" arrangement with the popular opposition, they would
be able to retain power until this storm of unrest eventually

blew itself out

.

The Civic Forum leadership and most of the

general public saw that the Communists were attempting to
retain control and rejected this action

by taking to the

streets
This upheaval was not another Prague Spring.

The events

of November and December of 1989 were not an effort to reform

or restructure the existing socialist model.

The mood in

1967-68 was that the Soviet model adopted by Czechoslovakia

after World War II could be improved and altered sufficiently
so that society's political,

be met.

social, and economic needs could

A decentralized economic model was proposed, along

with a free press, and more democratic freedoms.

The

experiment with "Socialism with a human face" ended with
The "Velvet Revolution" of 1989

Warsaw Pact invasion.
evolved as

a

fresh attempt at attaining

democratic system and

a

a

a

pluralist

market based economy outside the

boundaries of the existing socialist model.
In Timothy Garton Ash's words;

years,

in Hungary ten months,

"In Poland it took ten

in East Germany ten weeks:

perhaps in Czechoslovakia it will take ten days!
These words,

from an eyewitness accurately explain the

"Velvet Revolution,

"

or to be more precise,
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the nonviolent

end of Communist rule in Czechoslovakia.
it.

Ash explains,

organized

a

in his book,

"Students started

The Magic Lantern.

Students

demonstration on November 17 marking the fiftieth

anniversary of Jan Opletal, a Czech student who was murdered
by the Nazis.

This demonstration transformed into an anti-

government protest, and was met by riot police.

The

Czechoslovak government, cognizant of events that had swept
Erich Honecker from power weeks earlier, did not want to be
faced with the same bleak scenario.

By dispersing the crowd,

the regime had hoped to quell the opposition. However, quite
the opposite occurred.
the opposition,

alight"

Ash wrote that instead of eliminating

"this was the spark that set Czechoslovakia
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By November 19 very diverse opposition groups of opposition

met in Prague.

Vaclav Havel was among the leaders, and the

various groups included:

"Committee for the Unjustly

Prosecuted," the "Movement for Civic Freedoms," "Rebirth,"

(a

club of former Communists) and members of the Socialist Party
to mention a few.

This gathering established the Obcanske

Forum, or Civic Forum;
"as a spokesman on behalf of that part of the
Czechoslovak public which is critical of the existing
Czechoslovak leadership and which in recent days has been
profoundly shaken by the brutal massacre of peacefully
demonstrating students. "46

Civic Forum initially made four demands which included:
the immediate resignation of the communist leaders

responsible for preparing the Warsaw Pact intervention of
55

1968

Gustav Husak and Milos Jakes, the immediate resignation

of the Federal Interior Minister:

First Secretary Miroslav Stepan

Frantisek

— those

Kind

and Prague

responsible for the

violent repression of peaceful demonstrations, the

establishment of a special commission to investigate these
police actions, and the immediate release of all prisoners of
conscience

Addressing the question of the 1968 intervention
featured very prominently in the Civic Forum program.

It was

this event that shaped the last twenty-one years of

Czechoslovak history and had caused so much misery in the
country, and at last, the question of intervention, and

normalization were going to be confronted.
declared on December

1

The new politburo

that the WTO invasion that halted the

Prague Spring was wrong.

Vasil Mohorita, a new member of the

politburo stated that;
"We are of the opinion that the entry into our territory
of five armies of the Warsaw Pact in 1968 was not
justified, and the decision to do so was wrong. "47

Three days later the Soviet Union, Poland, Hungary, East
Germany, and Bulgaria broke with the past also by jointly

condemning the action.

The Soviet Union issued a separate

statement admitting that the invasion was wrong.

This was

the first official admission by the Soviet Union that the

invasion had been a mistake.

If there was any question

remaining about the applicability of the Brezhnev Doctrine,
the Soviet statement denouncing the invasion removed all
56

doubt.

Rezso Nyers, Chairman of the Hungarian Socialist

Party commented that the Soviet declaration was "a formal

repudiation of the Brezhnev Doctrine".
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A diverse group, Civic Forum was comprised of people
from all aspects of society and included:

signatories of

Charter 77, students, actors, intellectuals, and workers.
The Catholic Church was represented by Vaclav Maly, a priest,

Frantisek Cardinal Tomasek, the ninety year old Archbishop of
Prague who had opposed first Nazis, then Communists.

Members

of the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences titled "prognostics"
(

Prognosticky Ustav

)

were also part of the coalition, and

included Vaclav Klaus who is now the Finance Minister.

This

loose umbrella coalition maintained political pressure on the

Communist government until, lacking any meaningful response,
it collapsed after weeks of marches,

speeches, and strikes.

Even though Alexander Dubcek was hailed and cheered by
the thousands who had filled Wenceslaus Square on many

separate occasions, Vaclav Havel emerged as the popular
choice for leadership of the revitalized country.

On

November 27th millions of Czechs and Slovaks walked off their
jobs and brought the country to a standstill.
"It was a powerful demonstration of national solidarity in
support of free elections and opposition to Communist

domination

.
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By this point,

it was clear that there would be no "third

way," nor would there be a Communist dominated governing body
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that would accede to sharing power with another group.

Diplomats said that;
it has become an unstoppable wave
.the party has
clearly fallen apart
.it has no program, ...and is in
danger of finding itself excluded from power
altogether 50
.

.

.

.

.

Civic Forum, on the other hand, did have a program.

demanded a "proper" government, responsible to
and not the rule of one Party.

assembled crowd from

a

It

a parliament,

Vaclav Klaus read to an

document titled 'What We Want' and

subtitled 'Programmatic Principles of the Civic Forum' late
in November.

It proposed a new Czechoslovakia governed by

the rule of law guaranteed by an independent judiciary,

free

elections at all levels, a market economy, social justice,
respect for the environment and independent academic and

cultural life.

Later, Klaus read another statement

announcing that the Civic Forum:
"

considers its basic objective to be the definitive
opening of our society for the development of political
pluralism and for achieving free elect ions " 51

On November 28th, the Communist Party announced that it

would share power and sacrifice the leading position in
society.

Constant pressure was maintained by Civic Forum,

however, and on December

4

over 200,000 people poured into

Wenceslaus Square to reject the Communist government, and to
call for a general strike.

Three days later Prime Minister
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Adamec resigned and was replaced by Marian Calfa.

On that

same day, Vaclav Havel announced his readiness to be

president
"I have

repeatedly said my occupation is writer
.1
have no political ambitions.
I don't feel myself to be
professional politician. But I have always placed the
public interest above my own.
And if the situation
develops in such a way that the only service that I
could render my country would be to do this, then of
course I would do it " 52
.

.

a

.

On December 10, Human Rights Day, Gustav Husak swore in

the new government and resigned as president.

Faced with

a

continuing and unrelenting wave of protests and strikes, the
Communist dominated parliament agreed to give up control of
the nation's top two posts to the two most prominent

opponents of the ancien regime.

Alexander Dubcek became the

Chairman of Parliament, while Vaclav Havel was elected
President.

He became Czechoslovakia's first non-Communist

President since 1948.
"Dear friends I promise you that I will not betray your
I will lead this country to free elections.
confidence.
This must be done in an honest and calm way, so that the
clean face of our revolution is not soiled." 52

With the election of Vaclav Havel, Czechoslovakia ceased

reacting to perestroika and began implementing reforms that
go well beyond anything that has taken place thus far in the

Soviet Union.

The prospects for substantial reform in the

economic, political, and social spheres can be considered

limited only by the Czechs and Slovaks themselves. The Soviet
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Union would not reassert itself as

a

hegemonic power, Germany

was concerned primarily with integration of its eastern

provinces, and while the nations of the West greeted "the

fledgling democracies" with enthusiasm, and hope for

a

productive future, the ability to provide an aid plan to the
area was limited by their own domestic economic problems.

With the Soviet Union concentrating on domestic issues, and
West Germany trying to assess its move toward union with East
Germany, the smaller East-Central European states were not

caught between competing "great" powers, and this offered an

opportunity for

a

dramatic transition from Communism to an

indigenous socio-political model.

In the Czechoslovak case,

the transition began immediately.

Gorbachev provided the main impetus for change
throughout the region and the various elements of

Czechoslovak society which had remained dormant slowly began
to coalesce into an umbrella grouping that could successfully

challenge a thoroughly entrenched communist party.

The

leadership of this revolution was drawn mainly from the

Charter 77 human rights movement, but also included other
sections of society, notably students, workers, and the

Catholic Church.

This resulted in no loss of blood and a

relatively easy transition from the communist dominated
government to the interim Civic Forum government.

Civic

Forum immediately began changing the structure of government
and formulated new economic and political policies that were

leading to a free market model and a parliamentary system.
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According to Judy Batt, J.M.C. Rollo, and Brigitte Granville,
moving in this direction is the only avenue which may result
in economic success for not only Czechoslovakia,

of East-Central Europe as well.

but the rest

Their main viewpoint is that

since Leninist political structures had undermined all

previous attempts at economic reform, the removal of these
structures remained the only option open to these countries.

Judging from what the Civic Forum government has already

implemented with regard to decentralizing the economic
system,

and initiating a genuine political and economic

reform program, there can be no doubt that the direction

Czechoslovakia is moving is toward

a free

with a parliamentary democracy and

a

market combined

more "civil society."

For once in modern history the success or failure of this

reform effort lies squarely in the lap of Czechs and Slovaks.
No hegemony is encroaching upon Czechoslovakian soil.

There

is no Nazi Germany or Stalinist Russia threatening the

country.

Even the nations of the West are largely

concentrating on their own problems despite the fact that
they support free and independent states in East-Central
Europe.

What could damage the whole reform effort

are the

nationalist rivalries between Czechs and Slovaks that have

submarined past efforts at reform.

The "ethnic" or

"nationality" question is the main threat to reform.

If

Havel's government can overcome this obstacle then the
chances for a successful transition from communism are quite
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good and the longterm prognosis for economic and political

reform should be better.

The last section concentrates on

the changes that have been implemented thus far concludes

with an assessment of "post-communist" Czech and Slovak

Federated Republic.
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CHAPTER

4

AFTERMATH OF THE REVOLUTION

In the aftermath of the Velvet Revolution questions

emerged regarding Czechoslovakia's "new course."

The most

obvious of these were directed toward the political and

economic future of Czechoslovakia, as well as what the

philosophical underpinnings of the new government would be.
If reformed socialism was not an objective,

then what was?

Since 1948 Communists, guided by Marxist-Leninist ideology
had directed the country in all matters both political and
economic.

With the abrupt change in Prague, the question

arose as to what would replace Marxist-Leninism as the

philosophical centerpiece of Czechoslovak political and
economic decision making.
an attractive program,

The Communist Party did not have

and it became increasingly evident

that although the new Czechoslovak government might "borrow"
ideas from the social democratic systems of the West,

ie

.

Sweden, or West Germany there would be no return to

socialism.

For the first time in the 20th Century

Czechoslovakia was at liberty to devise

a

wholly new

political and economic agenda which would be largely

unimpeded by superpower politics.

The "Brezhnev Doctrine"

was dead and the Soviet Union continued concentrating on its

own problems in the various republics.
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West Germany was

primarily conccrnsd with reunifying with East Germany.
Czechoslovakia, in this century, has been affected negatively
by Germany, during the Nazi period, and after World War II by

Soviet Communism.

With a "benign," or at least distracted,

Germany and Soviet Union in Europe, Czechoslovakia can
develop and change its political and economic structure, not
to mention its foreign policy as its needs dictate.

These

changes began in earnest under the Civic Forum government led
by President Vaclav Havel in January 1990.

Communism of any kind is not in the offing.

A restructured
The goal of the

new government is a legitimate functioning democracy, in a

pluralist society, with an open and free market.
ends,

To these

the government has, and continues to work even at the

writing of this thesis.
The monumental task of establishing a working market

economy began with the passage of legislation through the
Federal Assembly.

The economists involved in developing the

new program included Valtr Komarek and Vaclav Klaus.

Both

men had worked at the Institute for Economic Forecasting at
the Academy of Sciences and had advocated changing the system
of centralized planning.

An article by Klaus titled;

"The

Imperatives of Long Term Prognosis and the Dominant

Characteristics of the Present Economy" outlined some parts
of the plan.

The article argued for "rapid" and "profound"
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economic reforms and draws attention to the importance of
changing the economic policies of "the center,

"

in order to

promote market functions.
Immediately after the fall of Communism, the new

Czechoslovak government slowly began to identify and address
major problem areas.

Knowing that in order for democracy to

succeed a stable economic environment would be necessary,
Havel's government began by attempting to attract Western
investment

.

An Act on private Entrepreneurship of Czech

Citizens effectively stripped away previous limits on private

business
"The law allows Czechoslovak citizens to establish
practicing any type of private enterprise with no
restrictions on the number of employees, or the extent of
property accumulation." 54

For the transition from Communism to a market economy to
be successful,

economic assistance from the West would be

necessary, and direct foreign investment in Czechoslovakia
was the most beneficial for it due to the fact that it would

increase the hard currency assets, thereby allowing

Czechoslovakia to strengthen its overall economic base.
Czechoslovakia needed hard currency to purchase oil from the
Soviet Union

operation.

in order to keep its industrial machines in

Since January

1,

1990 the Soviet Union required

oil payments to be in hard currency.

In addition to this,

oil would not be subsidized to the extent that it had been

before
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In addition to attracting direct foreign investment,

the

Czechoslovak government changed budget allocations for 1990.
"The governments approval on March 8 of the state budget
for 1990 was an important step toward economic reform." 55

Vaclav Klaus described it as "the most significant document
of the governments economic policy"

.

The government

transformed an earlier version of the budget that called for
a 10 billion koruna

[$1

billion official] into

a

half billion

dollar surplus.
"Fifteen billion koruny have been cut from the budget by
reducing state subsidies in agriculture, mining, state
administration, and defense." 56
The new budget reduced wage and price subsidies by 14%,

subsidies to state enterprises by 10.7%, subsidies to farmers
by 13%, and government administrative costs by 5%.

billion koruny
discontinued.

The one

previously allocated annually to the CPCz was
In addition to cutting subsidies the

government began "phasing out" some heavy industries which
were built during the 1950s.

In order to address the problem

of unemployment which would result as some industries were

closed, the government drafted a law on unemployment

benefits, and this went into effect in January.

Klaus stated that price increases were inevitable for

traditionally heavily subsidized items such as food, housing,
and transportation.

"If we do not raise prices quickly, we

could all pay dearly for it in the end."

The goal,

own words is "a market economy without adjectives."
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in Klaus'

He

identified the lack of property rights and lack of local

purchasing power as obstacles to reform. He further stressed
the need for an effective pricing structure in order to

overcome obstacles to economic reform.

Czechoslovakia's history of conservative fiscal and

monetary policies has kept the country's borrowing to
minimum.

a

Today its debt is roughly $8 billion. The strong

industrial base is in a competitive position, especially if

military production is successfully turned into civilian
production.

Direct foreign investment such as joint

ventures have been a key ingredient in the process of
transformation.

Bloc Magazine reported that entering into

the second half of 1990 there were a total of 602 joint

ventures in Czechoslovakia.
"Eighty percent of the joint ventures possess capital of
less than 1 million kcs (41, 666) and one third have less
than 100,000 kcs ($4,166)." 57

Bloc also reported that the largest proportion of joint

ventures is in Prague

(48%),

followed by Bratislava (16%) and

The country breakdown is as follows:

Austria-

Brno

(8%)

171,

Germany-163, Switzerland-57, United States-32, Great

Britain-23
Prior to the enacting of joint venture legislation, the

Civic Forum government assessed the state of the economy by
issuing its "state of the nation report" in February 1990.
On February 27th Marian Calfa spoke to the Federal Assembly

regarding the economy

.

In his speech he painted a detailed
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and bleak picture of the economic stagnation that had left

Czechoslovakia far behind the West.

Calfa described the

catastrophic devastation of the environment, low standard of
living, and the growing social problems.

Calfa condemned the

Communist Party's lethargy and monopoly of power, as well as
its lack of effective leadership, and said that it "spelled

death" for creative initiative; which in turn, had gradually

undermined the whole economy.
In January,

transition to

a

Calfa outlined the government's plan for

a

market economy, which, he said, would be an

extremely complex task.
In the first stage,

a

The plan consisted of four stages.

legislative and organizational base

would be established incorporating laws to regulate
ownership, competition, and the role of monopolies.
Secondly, new pricing systems would be introduced.

The third

stage would consist of expansion of international trade,

liberalized import restrictions,

convertibility of the koruna.
be introduced,

a free flow of capital,

Lastly,

a new tax

and

system would

government subsidies "significantly reduced,"

and prices decontrolled.
The disagreement between Czechoslovak economists at this

point was not that these plans shouldn't be implemented, but

rather the timing of the implementation.
"The timing of the economic reforms has become a basic
point of disagreement between Federal Deputy Prime
Minister Valtr Komarek, who has advocated the gradual
approach, and Finance Minister Vaclav Klaus, who has
co
called for faster progress."
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Prime Minister Calfa agreed with Komarek.
"The process would have to be gradual
.in view of the
economy's continued dependence on them, state enterprises
could not be privatized immediately but only over the
long term 5 9
.

.

.

Klaus asserted that the first priority was to ensure that

ending central planning did not bring rapid inflation.

February
least 15%

1,

.

On

1990 he announced plans to cut subsidies by at
His idea was to run a surplus equal to roughly 2%

of state spending,

compared to the previous deficit of 1.5%.

Klaus bluntly said that "there is nothing to wait for."

He

further cautioned against half-measures, stating that they

could be counterproductive.
On the other hand, Komarek warned that if a market

economy were suddenly thrust upon Czechoslovakia that
economic chaos would result.

Some,

like Komarek,

feared

that moving too fast would cause extreme inflation and

production losses.

In various interviews,

Klaus stated that

he felt that the problem of liberalizing prices without

creating Polish hyperinflation could be solved by using

a

formula which would dismantle the price control system after
the state monopolies had been dissolved.

"Klaus hoped that

this sequence would create a competitive environment and
0
control price increases." 0
ft

Regarding the issue of privatization, Klaus stated that
a

considerable part of the Czechoslovak economy would remain
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under some type of state control in the future.

He said that

as much as forty percent of the economy would be retained by

the state.

These included major public works, water

facilities, and transportation facilities.

The goal of

privatization of small and medium sized enterprises was one
which could be achieved quickly.

These,

in turn,

would not

be managed by the various ministries, which would eliminate

some of the bureaucracy.

In addition to the above,

legislation provided that some state enterprises would be
given the opportunity to become joint stock companies, and to

privatize
The East European Reporter wrote that the debate between

"staged transition" and "shock therapy" was solved in favor
of the latter with the Federal Assembly's adoption of "The
The three main points were

Scenario for Economic Reform."

privatization, price liberalization, and internal
Both Bloc Magazine and Europe

convertibility for the koruna.

Magazine reported that although the some of the details of
this plan have yet to be worked out, it is certain that this

proposal has given the final approval for
to a market economy.

a

rapid transition

Radio Free Europe Research reported in

January 1990 that Czechoslovakia was looking to other
countries while it considered

a

viable economic strategy.

"Its long social democratic tradition and understandable
concern over the high cost of the economic transition
have made the Swedish or West German concept of a social
6
market economy' an attractive choice."
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Czechoslovak Radio reported that in early March a whole
series of economic laws was drafted after the Czechoslovak

government had studied similar laws in West Germany.

Jaroslav Vostatek, the Secretary General of the Economic
Council of the Czechoslovak federal government emphasized
that a law being drafted on state enterprises would eliminate

provisions related to "self administration."
"Allowing those provisions to remain would have created a
potentially inflationary situation such as that in
Yugoslavia, permitting workers to raise wages without
assuring corresponding increases in productivity ." 62

Vostatek said that the self administration concept could
be applied in smaller enterprises that operate in a free

market environment as long as the employees took

responsibility for the economic results.

The goal was to

encourage a system of enterprises similar to the large joint
stock companies in West Germany, where workers are part of
the decision-making process and have significant

representation on the supervisory boards.
The overwhelming victory by Civic Forum and Public

Against Violence in the June elections gave Havel's

government the mandate it needed to enact more sweeping

economic reforms in order to place Czechoslovakia in

competitive position.

a

more

In conjunction with the economic

reform measures, and at least as important were the political
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reforms immediately initiated by Civic Forum.

The new

government proceeded to move the country in the direction of

multiparty democracy.

a

Legislation was passed in February 1990 facilitating the
emergence of new political parties
for voting and membership.

and providing guidelines

Over forty new parties emerged

covering a wide political spectrum.

The Communist Party had

some splinter groups like the Czech Democratic Forum, and the

Independent Left. A Social Democratic party has been

officially re-established after many years of being merged
with the CPCz

.

At least five parties with Christian-

democratic programs exist and claim roughly 70,000 members.
The Czechoslovak Democratic Initiative and the Liberal

Democratic Party represent those advocating political and
economic liberalism.

The Republican Union,

Republican Party,

and the Civic Democratic Alliance claim to advocate Western
style political conservatism and economic liberalism.
is also the Green Party,

There

founded in December 1989, which

claims widespread support in both the Czech Republic and
Slovakia.

Given the extent of the ecological devastation

caused by forty years of Communism, it is likely that the
Green Party will play a major role in Czechoslovak politics
into the 1990s.

The above represent those political parties

which will probably be significant political forces in the
country,

or if not successful by themselves will forge

coalition partnerships with each other, or smaller fringe
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elements.

The carefree attitude of the Velvet Revolution is

reflected by the presence of small parties such as; The
Friends of Beer, and the Flexible Party.

Almost as quickly as the political party structure began
to take shape in Czechoslovakia,

so did the new foreign

policy
"For the first time since the Communist takeover in 1948,
Czechoslovakia has returned to independent international
activism, seizing the opportunity to pursue its own
interests 63
.

At present the fundamental tenet of Czechoslovak foreign

policy is to contribute to the development of the idea of
"common European home."

a

To that end it has placed keen

interest in disarmament, promoted closer economic cooperation

between West and East, has continued active relations with
the Soviet Union, and has played a role in German

reunification.

In an effort to show more independence from

Moscow, and illustrate the country's new shift in priorities,

President Havel visited Germany, Canada, Poland, Hungary, and
the United States during his first months in office.

Early

in February Czechoslovakia and Israel resumed full diplomatic

relations after a lapse of over twenty years.

Czechoslovakia has expressed an interest in joining the
European Community and as early as February 1990 began

planning for this goal.

At a conference in Paris Jiri
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Dienstbier said that;
"Czechoslovakia hopes for regional cooperation among
Central European nations
.Such regional cooperation
will also facilitate eventual East European association
with the economic community of Western Europe ." 64
.

.

There can be little doubt that Czechoslovakia would like
to join the European Community soon.

Rita Klimova, the

Czechoslovak Ambassador to the United States, when questioned
about whether or not Czechoslovakia wanted to join the

European Community replied;
"Who wouldn't want to be a member of the E.C.? That
would signify a full-fledged and functioning market
economy 65
.

Since the economic problems faced by Czechoslovakia must
be considered of prime importance it is not surprising that

many foreign policy endeavors undertaken by the new
government were geared toward changing Czechoslovakia's

economic relationship with the rest of the world.
of the year

By the end

the Havel government was successful in obtaining

Most Favored Nation (MFN)

Status from the United States, and

joining both the World Bank, and the International Monetary
Fund.

Bloc magazine reported that the awarding of MFN status

could increase Czechoslovak exports to the United States by
200 - 300 %

.

Havel's government has initiated substantial political

reform during its first six months in office.

The Federal

Assembly played a major role in adopting legislation

guaranteeing certain human rights, such as freedom of
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association,

freedom of assembly, the right to petition, and

freedom of the press.

Richard Sacher, the new Interior

Minister has curtailed police actions.

While the new

government began taking steps to protect basic human rights,
it also made changes in its penal code.

The death penalty

was abolished and several activities like "damaging the

interests of the republic" ceased to be "political crimes."

Richard Sacher, the new Interior Minister has curtailed
police action and interference with social and political
groups
Judy Batt wrote that;
.whose authority
"a new type of leadership is needed
is derived from the support of a Parliament
.

.

.Electoral reform and the resuscitation of genuine
parliamentary politics provide the essential underpinning
for reformist leadership." 66
.

.

The "new leadership" is needed not only to assist in the

implementation of the economic transition but to also address
the societal problems that have been caused by over forty

years of communism.

In looking at the period from January-

June 1990 my conclusion is that the Civic Forum government
has been successful in the resuscitation of genuine

parliamentary politics as well as the curtailing of the power
of the bureaucracies.

The philosophical outlook of Vaclav

Havel has been at least partly responsible for this.

charismatic leader who concentrates on "morality

He is a

versus

expediency in the decision-making process and he, by virtue
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of his office,

has reintroduced morality into the Czech and

Slovak political culture.

If this is combined with the Czech

tradition of participation in societies, clubs, and various
other associations, which had not been totally extinguished
by forty years of communism, then the end result will be

country that has abandoned Marxist-Leninism in favor of

a
a

pluralistic "civil society."
Czechoslovakia has entered a new phase of its history
and although there are still people who call themselves

"communists" and a legitimate communist party still remains,
the chances of a return to this type of system are non-

existent in the short term and highly unlikely in the long
run.

Charles Gati has said that;
"The Communist period lacks appealing historical figures
These exceptions
to remember except Nagy and Dubcek
antifervent
of
atmosphere
aside, the prevailing
no
subtle
allows
anti-Sovietism
communism and
7
distinctions to be made."
.

Czechoslovakia will not be emulating

a Soviet

model in the

future, but will move in the direction of a more western

social,

economic, and political model.

Whatever post-

communist Czechoslovakia arrives at for this model, there are

certainly elements of it which will be "uniquely Czech.
Two conflicting forces have shaped political life in

postwar East-Central Europe:

The presence and integrating

influence of Soviet communism, on the one hand, and the

diverse political, economic, and cultural traditions of these
countries, on the other.

Until Gorbachev the former of these
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forces was the stronger of the two.

With his ascent to power

the individual nations have been able to reassert themselves
in international politics and economics.

This is due to the

fact that although the Soviet Union continues to influence

the area, under Gorbachev it has concentrated on domestic

problems while also implementing a more flexible foreign

policy toward the area.

As the Soviet Union's foreign policy

relied less and less on ideology and national security
interests were re-evaluated the countries of East-Central

Europe suddenly achieved an autonomy that they had not had
since the interwar period (1918-1938)

.

This autonomy has

resulted in a movement by the new Czechoslovak government
away from a single party, centrally controlled system,

in

the direction of a more western political and economic model.
The transition government in Czechoslovakia has realized

that meaningful reform cannot simply be attained by extensive

personnel changes in the apparatus and is moving in the
direction of parliamentary politics.
"This government is taking vigorous legislative action to
68
satisfy popular demand for democratic political reform."
In researching this thesis the recurrent theme maintained

by many is that despite the mass demonstrations,

role of the

church, and dissident activity in Czechoslovakia the

singlemost influential factor resulting in the demise of

communism in this country was Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev.
variety of
Indeed, authors cite the fact that there were a
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"forces" at play which caused the communist government to
step down in 1989, but most, including Charles Gati, Judy

and William Luers all point to Gorbachev as the

Batt,

decisive factor.

In this analysis

I

must agree.

Indigenous

attempts at reform whether from above as in Czechoslovakia in
1968,

or from below,

as in Hungary in 1956 were seen as a

threat to the Soviet Union both ideologically and

politically.

Gorbachev changed the variables throughout his

tenure by indicating in speeches, writings, and actions that
Soviet interests had changed.

When he formally killed the

Brezhnev doctrine in his Strasbourg speech in June of 1989
this gave "carte blanche" to the governments of East-Central

Europe to modify their systems.

The Czechoslovak government,

which could never reconcile the after effects of the "Prague
Spring" with the new "Moscow Spring" was, quite simply,
Lacking support from the Soviet

abandoned by its own people.

Union, the Czechoslovak government collapsed.

After evaluating the decline and fall of communism in

Czechoslovakia it is useful to end with
future research for this subject.

It

a short comment about

is logical to assume

that as this paper is being written, others are also

grappling with the causes of communism's demise and
attempting to weigh the impact of the individual actors
involved.

As stated earlier, my research has indicated that

Gorbachev provided the main impetus for change

.

Although

the
there are articles describing the mass demonstrations and

individual who led them, it would be useful to have an in
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depth examination of the Civic Forum group and other major

groupings in both the Czech lands and Slovakia to illustrate

their precise role in the months of November and December
1989.

It would also be interesting to see how the

Czechoslovak military reacted to the monumental changes.
What has been most interesting to me has been the role played
by the Catholic Church, not only as an alternative to the

Marxist-Leninist ideology, but also as
the shaping of the new government.

a

political factor in

In November 1989 when the

crowds were cheering, one must remember that some of the

chants were "Havel, Dubcek, Tomasek*"

An historical study of

religion in Czechoslovakia from the aftermath of the Prague

Spring to the aftermath of the Velvet Revolution is necessary
to understand the important role that it played in society as

the largest "organized" alternative to Marxist-Leninism and

communist domination.

Lastly, new works on the country are

needed which examine its politics, economics, and culture.
Most works concentrate on the Prague Spring or its aftermath.
Part of the problem with writing about this area is that the

changes happened so quickly in 1989 that viewpoints on "the
limits of reform" had to be changed to reflect what exactly

happened.

One could assume that except for smaller analyses

contained in journals and magazine articles, that book length
works will not be widespread until more data is compiled and
what
more evaluation done on how and why communism collapsed,
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the aftermath will be, and how these countries are dealing

with their "new found freedom."

In Czechoslovakia,

the

situation can be summed up by a quotation from Havel during
his New Year's Day address,

1990:

"People, your government has returned to you." 69

"Tva vlada,

lide,

se k tobe navratila!"

80

ENDNOTES
1

William H. Luers,
Foreign Affairs volume
,

p.

"Czechoslovakia's Revolution,"
number 2 (Spring 1990)

69,

:

78.
2

Reform
p.

Karen Dawisha, Eastern Europe Gorbachev and
(Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1989),
.

167.
3

Ibid.
4

Ibid. p.

169.

5

Judy Batt, Economic Reform and Political Change in
A Comparison of Czechoslovak and
Eastern Europe:
(New York:
Hungarian Experiences.
St. Martin's Press,
1988), p.

283.

6

Vladimir Kusin, "Reform and Dissidence in
Czechoslovakia", Current History November 1987: p. 384.
,

7

Czechoslovakia's Road to Socialism (Action
Programme of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia)
Adopted April 5, 1968. p. 89.
Two worthwhile analyses of the Action Programme are:
The Czechoslovak Experiment 1968-1969 by Ivan Svitak and
The Czechoslovak Reform Movement by Galia Golan.
8

Galia Golan, The Czechoslovak Reform Movement
Harvard University Press, 1971), p. 277.
(Cambridge:
9

Josef Smrkovsky published an
Ibid. p. 303.
"Democracy
in May 1968 titled:
Pravo
Rude
article in
the need
emphasized
he
where
Overnight"
Does Not Come
the
outside
operate
would
which
for institutions
democratic
"guarantee"
would
that
and
Communist Party

freedoms
10

Ivan Volgyes Politics in Eastern Eu rope
Dorsey Press, 1986), p. 91.
(Chicago:
,

81

11

1945

Hans Renner, A History of Czechoslovakia Since
Routledge Publishers, 1989), p. 101.

(London:
12

Ibid. p.

100.

Ibid. p.

101.

13

14

Vladimir Kusin, Radio Free Europe Research:
Report on the USSR vol 13, number 31, "Gorbachev's
Evolving Attitude Toward Eastern Europe"
August 4,
,

.

,

1989. p.

16.

15

Mikhail Gorbachev, April 1985 Plenary Meeting
CPSU (Facts on File, [April 1985]), p. 687.
16

Mikhail Gorbachev, Perestroika: New Thinking for
(New York: Harper and Row
Our Country and the World
Publishers, 1987), p. 29.
17

Vladimir Kusin, Radio Free Europe Research:
Situation
number 28, "Czechoslovakia
Report #11", July 2, 1985. p. 3.
,

vol.

10,

18

Vladimir Sobell, Radio Free Europe Research:
vol. 11, number 1, "Background Report #150",
December 1985. p. 13.

,

19

Peter Matuska, Radio Free Europe Research;,
Report on the USSR vol. 11, number 7, "Czechoslovakia
Situation Report #2", February 6, 1986. p. 35. Original
text from Hospodarske Noviny.
,

20

Vladimir Sobell, Radio Free Europ e Research:,
vol. 11, number 12, "Czechoslovakia Situation Report #4,
Radio Prague
March 10, 1986. p. 4. Originally from
broadcast February 15, 1986.

82

21

Vladimir Kusin, Radio Free Europe Research:
number 17
"Czechoslovakia Situation Report
,

vol.

11,
April 16,

1986. p.

#6,

3.

22

Ibid

.

p

.

4

.

23

Economist, April 16,

1986. p.

52.

24

Vladimir Sobell, Radio Free Europe Research:
12, number 3, "Czechoslovakia Situation Report #1",
January 17, 1987. p. 31.
,

vol.

25

Vladimir Sobell, Radio Free Europe Research:
number 5, "Czechoslovakia Situation Report#2,"
Strougal's
February 6, 1987. p. 9. From Lubomir
speech on January 27, 1987.
,

vol.

12,

26

Ibid
27

Economist Intelligence Unit 1989-90
Czechoslovakia: Country Profile pp 12-13
28

Renner p. 159.
29

Robert R. Bowie, The Christian Science Monitor:
"The Prague Spring and Perestroika",
August 17, 1988. p. 9.
30

Charles Gati, Foreign Affairs:
Its Own", Summer 1988. p. 111.

"Eastern Europe on

31

McLeans:

April 16,

1987,

"Gorbachev's Prague Spring",
p.

14.

32

Ibid. p.

15.

83

33

Vladimir Kusin, Radio Free Europe Research:
vol 13, number 3, "Czechoslovakia Situation Report #1,
January 22, 1988, p. 4.
r

34

Vladimir Kusin, Radio Free Europe Research: vol
number 16, "Czechoslovakia Situation Report #6,
April 19, 1988, p. 39.
,

13,

35

Vaclav Maly,
Christian Science Monitor:
"Czech
Church Thrives in Private Homes", August 22, 1988.
p.

28.
36

Jiri Pehe, Radio Free Europe Research:
vol.
number 14, "Czechoslovakia Situation Report #7,
April 3, 1989. p. 3.
,

14,

37

Jiri Pehe, Jan Obrman, Radio Free Europe
Research
vol. 14, number 4, "Czechoslovakia Situation
Report #2", January 26, 1989. p. 18.
.

38

vol. 14,
Jiri Pehe, Radio Free Europe Research:
#6",
Report
Situation
"Czechoslovakia
number 13,
March 30, 1989. p. 27.
,

39

vol. 14,
Jiri Pehe, Radio Free Europe Research:
4, "Czechoslovakia Situation Report #2", Janaury
,

number
26,

1989. p.

13.

40

Vladimir Kusin, Radio Free Europe—Research l, vol.
14, number 38, "Czechoslovakia Situation Report #19,
September 20, 1989, pps 3-5.
.

41

Timothy Colton, The Dilemma of Refor m in the
Council on Foreign
(United States:
Soviet Union
209.
Relations Book), p.
42

Luers p

.

77

84

43

Ibid. p.

98.

44

Timothy Garton Ash, The Magic Lantern
Random House, 1990), p. 78.

(New York:

45

Ibid. p.

80.

46

Ibid

.

p

.

82

47

The
Bernard Gwertzman and Michael T. Kaufman eds
Collapse of Communism
New York: New York Times
From New York Times article
Company, 1990), p. 300.
December 1, 1989 by Serge Schmemann, "Czech party Calls
1968 Invasion Wrong".
.

,

(

48

December 4, 1989 article by Bill
302.
"WTO Condemns 68 Prague Invasion".

Ibid. p.

Keller,
49

November 27 1989 article by R.W.
Ibid. p. 257.
Apple Jr. "Millions of Czechs Increase pressure on
Party"
50

Ibid
51

Ash. p.

107.

52

Boston Globe,

December

4,

1989. p.

1.

53

Gwertzman and Kaufman, Ibid. p. 311. Article by
He'd Accept Top
"Havel Makes It Official:
Henry Kamm:
Billing"
54

Ibid. p.

346.

55

Bloc Magazine April/May 1990,

85

p.

4.

56

Peter Martin, Radio Free Europe Research:
vol
1, number 16, "Czechoslovakia Situation Report",
April 20, 1990, "Problems of Economic Transition"
13
p
,

.

.

57

Ibid.
58

Bloc Magazine January/February 1991, p.

7.

59

Martin,

Ibid. p.

12.

60

Ibid
61

Ibid.
62

Vladimir Kusin, Radio Free Europe Research:
1, number 2, "Czechoslovak Situation Report #1",
January 20, 1990, p. 12.
,

vol.

63

Bloc Magazine Jan/Feb 1991

p.

14.

64

Peter Martin, Radio Free Europe Research:
#3",
1, number 10, "Czechoslovak Situation Report
,

vol.

March

9,

1990,

16.

p.

65

Ibid

.

p

.

17

.

66

Europe Magazine, November 1990, #301.
with Rita Klimova", p. 9.

"Interview

67

J.M.C. Rollo, The New Eastern Europe
"Political Context", (New York:
Batt,
Judy
Press), p. 11.
Relations
Foreign

86

:

article by
Council on

68

Charles Gati, Foreign Affairs: Winter 1990/91
vol
69, number 5.
"East-Central Europe: The Morning
After" p 131
.

,

.

69

Ash p. ii.
"Tva vlada, lide, se k tobe
navratila!", from Havel's 1990 New Year's Address.
Appendix 1

87

APPENDIX A
OUTLINE OF THE ACTION PROGRAM

Under the title Czechoslovakia s Road To
Socialism, the Czechoslovak Communist Party published
an "Action Programme" on April 9, 1968.
There are
noticeable similarities between this program and
Gorbachev's program of perestroika. The major points
of the Action Programme are listed below.
'

1.
The guarantee of freedom of speech, press,
assembly, and religious observance.

Electoral laws to provide a broader choice of
candidates
2

.

Broad economic reforms giving economic enterprises
3.
greater independence, convertable currency, revival of a
limited amount of private trade, and increased trade
with the West
4.

An independent judiciary.

Federal status for Slovakia on an independent basis
5.
and a new constitution drafted by 1969.
Full rehabilitation of all persons unjustly
persecuted during 1949-54.
6.

Security police will curb their activities to only
those matters involving the security of the state
7

.

8.

Recognition of past errors.

Willingness of the Communist Party of
Czechoslovakia to adapt
9.

The Communist Party's leadership role should be
based on the voluntary support of the people.
10.

11.

Censorship will be eliminated.

The goals of the Action Program have been summed up
nicely by Ivan Volgyes. Political liberalization,
economic liberalization, and f ederalizat ion of the
national system. These, like Gorbachev's aims were to
be carried out within the framework of socialism.
.
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APPENDIX B
OUTLINE OF PERESTROIKA

Gorbachev's prime effort since becoming the leader of
the Soviet Union in 1985 has been to bring the Soviet
economy out of the economic malais that he attributed
mainly to Brezhnev.
In order to accomplish this task
Gorbachev realized that sweeping changes had to be made
throughout Soviet society.
In some cases, the changes
that have been proposed and enacted are similar to those
proposed by the Dubcek leadership in 1968.
Some of the elements of perestroika include:
1.
Glasnost, or openess
designed to acknowledge
mistakes of past leaders, and to "rehabilitate" nonpersons of Soviet history like Nicolai Bukharin.
:

Plenary Meeting of CPSU Central Committee January
27-28 1987 decided upon organizational reform and
democratization of party life.
2.

Liberalization of the economy by allowing some
3.
enterprises more autonomy.
Closer cooperation with the West in economics, arms
control, and disarmament.
4.

Extension of democracy in socialist self
management
5.

Greater openess, criticism and self criticism in
all fields of public life.
6.

7.

Reform of the electoral procedure.

8.

Changes in foreign policy:

"a common

European

home "
9.

Greater tolerance of religion.

10.

Less restrictions on the media.

This short listing is by no means all inclusive.
It is meant as an outline of some of the major points of
restructuring under Mikhail Gorbachev
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APPENDIX C
CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND EAST-CENTRAL
EUROPE 1985-1989

1985
March 11

Mikhail Gorbachev elected general secretary

CPSU.

May 30-31
Gustav Husak, leader of Czechoslovakia met
with Gorbachev

1986
Feb 26-Mar

6

XXVII CPSU Congress

Mar 24-28

Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (CPCz)
holds
Anti-reform stand taken
its 17th Congress.
by hard-liners.

Sep

Members of the "Jazz Section", a group of
musicians arrested by police.

2

1982
Feb

7

Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze
Ties between Prague and
visits Prague:
Rude Pravo not
"strained".
reported
Moscow
speeches
Gorbachev's
of
reports
carrying
Union.
Soviet
in
the
restructuring
about

Mar 18

Gustav Husak publicly endorses Soviet
reforms and vows to adopt a similar
program

Dec 17

Gustav Husak resigns and is replaced by
Milos Jakes.

198 &
Jan 11

Backs reforms and
Jakes visits Gorbachev.
views".
declares "a unity of

Mar

Church activists arrested by police.
Prague mass at St Vitus Cathedral turns
into a rally for religious freedom.

5

.

Aug 10

Rude Pravo attacks Alexander Dubcek for
allowing the events of 1968 to go out of
control
90

Aug

20

Members of Charter 77 arrested for laying
flowers at the statue of St. Wenceslaus.
10,000 people march in protest of the 20th
anniversary of the Soviet invasion.
Protesters shout "Dubcek, Dubcek
Soviets out of Czechoslovakia."
.

Oct 10

.

.

Premier Lubomir Strougal along with the
entire cabinet resign. Ladislav Adamec
replaced Strougal, who had been one of the
only advocates of economic reform in the
Party hierarchy. Viewed as a victory for
the "anti-reform" element in the CPCz

i2.s_a

Feb 22

Playwright-activist Vaclav Havel convicted
Sentenced to nine
of illegal protests.
months

Oct

On the 71st anniversary of the founding of
democratic government, protests against the
Communist government are crushed.

28

Nov 20-21

More than 200,000 march for freedom in
Wenceslaus Square, largest demonstration
Communists hold talks with new
since 1968.
opposition leaders.

Nov 23-24

Alexander Dubcek, reformist leader forced
from power in 1968 re-emerges in public.
Communist Party leadership resigns:
general secretary Milos Jakes replaced.

Nov 28

Communist government promises to yeild
monopoly on power and allow non— Communists
Parliament approves next day.
in cabinet.

Dec

4

Hungary, Soviet Union, East Germany,
Poland, and Bulgaria condemn 1968 military
suppression of liberalization in
Czechoslovakia

Dec

1

Noncommunist government assumes power for
the first time in forty one years.
Communist President Gustav Husak resigns.

91

Dec 28-29

Parliament elects Dubcek its chairman,
Vaclav Havel president of the nation.

1990
The newly named Czech and Slovak Federated Republic
begin the tranf ormat ion from a Communist dominated one
party state to a parliamentary political system and a
functioning market economy.

92

APPENDIX D
CZECHSLOVAKIA ELECTION DATA JUNE 1990

Czechslovakia General Elections
June

8

and

1990

9,

%

of vote

Czech

Slovak

Civic Forum

51.6

Public Against Violence

-

34.9

Communist Party

13.7

13.6

Christian Democrats

8.7

17.8

Slovak National Party

-

11.2

Hungarian National Party

-

8.5

Society for Self Governing Democ
Others

.

8.5

14.0

17.5

The offical name of the country is the Czech and
Slovak Federated Republic.
1.

The bicameral Federal Assembly has control over
foreign affairs, defense, overall economic policy and
constitutional matters. The Assembly is comprised of a
Chamber of Nations (75 Czech and 75 Slovak delegates),
and a Chamber of People (137 Czech and 63 Slovak
The President of the Assembly is Alexander
deputies)
2

.

.

Dubcek
The Czech Republic (CR) and Slovak Republic (SR) are
represented by parallel institutional structures. The
Czech National Council (with 200 deputies) and the
The
Slovak National Council (with 150 deputies)
Federal Assembly draws its membership from these
National Councils.
3.

.
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